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EDITOR'S PAGE

TWENTY-ONE YEARS ago, the Midwest Sociological Society started publishing an official journal, the *MIDWEST SOCIOLOGIST*. Beginning as a small offset-printed publication, it was developed over the years into a regular semiannual journal serving the professional and scholarly needs of members of the Society. In the last several years, its pursuit of a vigorous policy of selective publication has brought recognition beyond the Midwestern region and has pointed up a real need for increased publication of research and analytical writings. In recognition of these developments, the Society, in April, 1959, voted to increase its dues to support an expanded journal, and, at the same time, accepted an offer from Southern Illinois University to subsidize it. The Society also authorized adoption of a new name which would signalize the journal's status as a quarterly and better represent its objective of reaching beyond regional boundaries in readership, content, and contributorship. The *MIDWEST SOCIOLOGIST* ended publication with Volume 21, No. 2, and *THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY* begins a new series with this issue.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY, as its name implies, will be a general sociological journal. Its editors will strive to maintain a fair balance between empirical research reports and interpretive writing, and to provide its readers with a sampling, at least, of the many areas of social life which sociologists are engaged in exploring. In keeping with this objective, preference will be given to articles which offer some new viewpoint, approach, or insight and contribute in some way, either to the elucidation of present theory or to the establishment of new theory. Contributions of 5,000 to 6,000 words will be favored, and conciseness, clarity, and vigor of style will be considered in selection of manuscripts.

All manuscripts should be typed, double-space, on standard-size ($8\frac{1}{2}'' \times 11''$) paper of at least sixteen-pound substance. Carbon copies and products of other forms of duplication will not be considered. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively throughout the paper, and *should be typed on separate pages placed at the end of the manuscript*. An abstract of not more than one hundred words

should appear under the title of each article.

In later issues much of this page will be given to comment on authors, articles and issues. Space available for this purpose is limited in the present issue, but fortunately our authors need no formal introduction to American sociologists. HERBERT BLUMER, who has long been known for his brilliant attacks on stereotyped ideas, here challenges the popular notion that incipient industrialization inevitably leads to misery and discontent on the part of the working class. ANSELM L. STRAUSS, a former student of Blumer and a strong exponent of symbolic interactionism, applies this approach to the analysis of *images* which people hold of their communities. His paper is a part of a larger study which will be published soon by the Free Press under the title, *Images of the American City*.

Our only theoretical offering is

JESSIE BERNARD's modest, but by no means slight, effort to outline a scheme into which the many forms of competition may be fitted. Mrs. Bernard, like her late husband, L. L. Bernard, has displayed competence in many fields of sociology. She is now on leave from her position at Pennsylvania State University to engage in teaching and research at Princeton. Symbolic interactionism appears in its more familiar form in MANFORD KUHN's report on results of his explorations of self-attitudes by means of free responses to the question, "Who am I?" ARNOLD M. ROSE, who was one of the young scholars selected, in 1940, to assist Gunnar Myrdal in his study of *The American Dilemma*, carries the problems of intergroup relations beyond national boundaries, asking how the social structure and political organization of different societies relate to their treatment of minorities.

Early Industrialization and the Laboring Class*

HERBERT BLUMER

THE VIEW that the early stages of industrialization inevitably lead to frustration, aggression, and rebelliousness on the part of the workers is challenged on theoretical and empirical grounds. Empirical evidence from recent cases of industrialization of backward areas shows wide variation in working conditions, rewards, and worker-management relations, and this variation is attributed to indigenous social and cultural factors and to accelerated social change rather than to industrialization *per se*.—EDITOR

THE DEVELOPMENT of the industrially retarded regions of the world has reawakened interest in the social consequences of early industrialization. The thinking of present-day scholars concerned with this problem is permeated by two major themes. The first is that the main social effect of early industrialization is the emergence of a class of industrial workers. The second is that this working class undergoes a typical and common development that is set by the intrinsic nature of the industrializing process. I am not going to concern myself in this brief paper with the first of these themes even though I think it is wrong. Instead I intend to consider the second theme. Tersely put, this latter theme or view holds that industrial life introduces a working environment which is strange, harsh, and unbearable for the newly recruited workers, with the

* Paper presented at the 1959 meeting of American Sociological Society. The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the Latin-American Cen-

ter for Research in the Social Sciences, Rio de Janeiro, for facilities and time in making a larger study, of which the present paper is a small portion.

consequence that they become disaffected and rebellious. This view has been derived chiefly from a picture of the industrial revolution in Great Britain; it is strongly tintured by Marxian class analysis; and it draws support from anthropological theory on cultural contact and from psychological theory on frustration and aggression. In my judgment the view is basically false and misleading. Its critical inspection is timely.

Let me spell out briefly the point of view. It presumes that the new industrial workers are wrenched loose from rural, village, or tribal communities, in which they have satisfactory status positions, supporting social ties, a familiar and acceptable authority system, and personalized work rhythms to which they are habituated. They are thrust into a strange and forbidding industrial setting, centered in the factory and the job. In this setting they have no status, little sense of personal dignity, no property or tools, no independence, and no customary work rights. They are forced to adjust to unfamiliar and onerous work rhythms and to bow to an alien and harsh system of discipline. They suffer, also, from inadequate communal or socialized relations with their fellow workers. In the face of these new and alienating conditions of work the workers are said to become insecure, discontented, and disaffected. "They hate the factory," as one prominent scholar puts it. Thus, unrest and feelings of protest germinate and grow among them. The feelings of protest are believed to express themselves in different ways: mildly, in curtailment of production, absenteeism, and the quitting of jobs; more vigorously, in sabotage, the destruction of industrial property, strikes, and riots; compensatorily, in personal and social disorganization or in orgiastic religious cults; and, above all, more lastingly in "radicalism," in militant labor movements or in revolutionary political movements.

The view rests on three tenets, each of which I wish to challenge: (1) that the background environment of the new industrial workers is in some significant way superior to that of the new industrial establishments; (2) that the workers find the new working environment to be alien and repelling, and thus that they become disaffected and discontented; and (3) that such feelings of disaffection lead the workers to "radicalism" and to "protest activity."

(1) The belief that the tribal, rural, or village situation from which the new workers come is for them superior to the factory

system into which they enter is not true in a large number of instances. On the economic side the belief is essentially self-contradictory. Workers usually migrate to factories because they prefer industrial employment to their current economic lot. Frequently, new industrial workers are impoverished rural tenants, poorly paid rural workers, small land owners eking out a precarious existence, poor village dwellers without steady employment, displaced artisans and moneyless tribesmen. On the social side the original background of the new workers may be as impoverished as their economic background. Frequently they have no property and they suffer corresponding social disadvantages. Frequently they are enmeshed in the lower levels of a highly personalized or paternal system, with little independence and with little opportunity for improving their social lot. Admittedly there is no uniformity to the economic and social conditions of the localities from which the new workers come. However, the evidence is more than sufficient to challenge the idea that for the workers these background conditions typically represent superior economic or social advantage to those encountered in industrial establishments.

(2) The second tenet, that the industrial setting is indigenously alien, repelling, and intolerable to the new workers, does not seem to me to have solid grounds. It is argued that the factory milieu—with its fixed working hours, mandatory work assignments, steady pace of work, and presumed monotonous tasks—clashes with the cultural background of the workers. The workers are said to be repelled by the new routines and to have great difficulty in adjusting to them. There is a large amount of evidence to controvert this allegedly typical picture. As repeated instances show, new workers may adjust quickly and satisfactorily to such routines. Especially when thoughtful and serious attention is given to programs of training—as is happening more frequently these days in newly industrializing regions—it is found that inexperienced workers fit readily and effectively into the industrial routines. Empirical evidence compels us, I think, to reject the idea that factory work, *ipso facto*, constitutes for the new workers a kind of cultural alienation or shock which they have great difficulty in resolving.

Similarly, I find flimsy evidence for the contention that the new workers naturally find factory authority and discipline to be unpalatable. Factory authority under early industrialization is in no

sense a constant but runs the gamut from being ruthless and arbitrary to being enlightened and hemmed in by legislation. Even when harsh, factory authority, frequently, is no worse than paternal or padronal authority in the field or the village. And further, even when it is unusually severe it is frequently taken to be a natural part of the new working situation which one has to live by.

It is also alleged by some students that relations with fellow workers at the work stations are barren of social and communal feelings and hence are found to be seriously wanting. The evidence seems to me to indicate clearly that this sort of condition is relatively rare. Usually fellow workers become acquainted with one another and weave into their work relations play, humor, banter, gossip, and interest in common topics of discourse.

In short, I find little evidence to support—and much evidence to contradict—the contention that for the workers the new industrial environment is intrinsically unnatural, menacing, and harsh. Today in the industrialization of underdeveloped countries one finds marked variation in conditions of employment, managerial practices, and work relations. Managers may have a free hand in setting hours, wages, and work assignments and be unrestricted in the exercise of disciplinary authority; or, as happens not infrequently, they may be subject to legislation which sets minimum wages and maximum hours, provides protection against unrestricted managerial authority, prohibits child labor, and accords a variety of worker privileges. Management may follow harsh or enlightened labor practices. Training programs may be available to the workers, or they may be left to struggle for themselves. Free opportunities may exist for promotion, or, instead castelike barriers and ceilings may be imposed on upward progression. In short, as a result of such factors as differing managerial policies, the presence or absence of controlling legislation, the interest or lack of interest in following standards of the advanced industrial countries, and the relaxations or pressures that are set by the state of the market, the social setting in industrial establishments may vary greatly.

Given this varied picture, it is a mistake to assume that the characteristic response of the new industrial workers is one of frustration, shock, resentment, and discontent. Such responses do occur. However, the instances are many indeed in which workers prize

industrial employment as a source of unaccustomed cash income, as an opportunity for a better standard of living, as a ladder to social advancement, and as an escape from a depressing local life. In view of the range of difference in the new industrial setting and in the background expectations of the workers entering into it, it is clearly hazardous to declare that the natural response of the workers to the new industrial setting is one of disaffection.

(3) On the basis of what has been said one must reject the remaining tenet that the new industrial workers are naturally led to "radicalism" and "protest behavior." As stated, they need not hate or reject their work situation. Even granting instances in which the workers resent and dislike their working situation they still need not engage in protest behavior. They may be fatalistic about their situation and, as human beings commonly do, accept it as in the order of existence. They may see no way of doing anything about their plight and turn their backs to protest activity. Any psychology which assumes that feelings such as discontent move relentlessly forward to overt expression is basically false. Feelings may be suppressed, held in abeyance, tempered, and transformed.

This ends my discussion of the three tenets. Enough has been said to show the fallacies of the view that early industrialization, by nature, alienates and disaffects workers, makes them radical, and propels them to protest behavior. The view should be discarded as a myth.

If we are to be realistic in our analysis we have to go even further than this. I think that the evidence points clearly to the conclusion that industrialization, by its very make-up, can have no definite social effect. It is neutral and indifferent to what follows socially in its wake. To attribute specific social effects to it is to misread its character; to seek in it the causes of specific social happenings is to embark on a false journey. While it lays down the lines along which new social forms may emerge, it does not explain the new forms that come into existence. It merely provides a neutral framework for the operation of other factors which produce and shape what comes into being. This view is so opposite to our deeply entrenched beliefs, so contrary to what students from Marx to the present have taken for granted, that it is necessary to defend and exemplify it as clearly as limited space permits. I shall confine my discussion to early industrialization and the laboring class, even

though the thesis of the neutrality of industrialization holds true for all areas of its operation.

In providing new forms of work, new occupations and jobs, and new sets of social relations, industrialization obviously brings a working class into existence. Yet it does not explain the make-up of that class nor the experience to which its members are subject nor the behavior which they develop. The nature of the early class of industrial workers may be said to depend on four factors: the composition of the class; the milieu encountered in industrial establishments; the conditions of life to which workers are subject outside of industrial establishments; and the schemes or definitions which the workers use to interpret their experience. It is my position that early industrialization is indifferent and neutral to each of these four basic conditions. Let me discuss each of them briefly.

Composition. The make-up of the working class depends on the kind of people who are recruited to it and on the differentiation which develops among them.

It should be obvious that industrialization is indifferent to the kinds of people who are recruited to fill its work positions. As mentioned earlier, the recruits may and do vary a great deal. They may be tribesmen, dispossessed land owners, members of a rural proletariat, villagers, city dwellers, or imported aliens. They may differ greatly in the conditions which lead them to seek industrial employment. Also, they may enter employment with widely different expectations, hopes, and demands. Industrialization, as such, is neutral with regard to these features of recruitment and exercises no control over them.

This condition of neutrality extends to the variety of conditions differentiating the workers from one another. Whether the working class is to be homogeneous or heterogeneous, whether marked by unity or by inner antagonisms, are matters for which industrialization is not responsible. To be true, a part of the differentiation of the working class is set by the character of the occupational structure and the wage structure: the occupations may be very varied or they may be similar, and the wage structure may show a wide range of differentials or a lumping of wages within narrow limits. However, a large measure of such occupational and work differentiation is not due to the intrinsic nature of industrialization; more important, industrialization does not account for the ways in

which workers define the occupational and wage differences between them. The more significant forms of differentiation inside of the new industrial classes come from the types of social discrimination which the workers apply to one another. All kinds of social discriminations may flow into the ranks of the workers—discriminations of geographical origin, ethnic make-up, caste membership, and religious affiliation. Anyone who runs his eyes over past and current instances of early industrialization must be acutely aware of the extent to which such established discrimination shapes the make-up of the class of workers.

What I wish to assert is that early industrialization is indifferent to, and has no responsibility for, the composition of the new working class, either in terms of who enter into it or in terms of how its members come to develop differentiation among themselves.

Nature of the Industrial Milieu. This same condition of neutrality is to be seen, oddly enough, in the case of the milieu to which the workers are subjected in their working establishments. Most students of early industrialization regard this milieu as the primary factor in moulding workers into a homogeneous and typical class. Yet the evidence shows great differences in working environments under early industrialization. As suggested in earlier remarks, the milieu in industrial establishments is subject to impressive variation. Working hours may be long and unregulated or moderate and state controlled. Working conditions may accord to the workers many rights and privileges or be barren of them. There may be open promotion or castelike barriers to upward progression. Management may be enlightened or be callous and indifferent to the workers. Inner discipline may be harsh, with no devices for worker protection, or be fair and provide some type of grievance procedure. Workers may be alien to each other or be members of a community group. It should be painfully clear that many alternate possibilities exist in the case of each element of the industrial situation. Now, the crucial point is that industrialization as a system of production does not determine the particular alternatives which, so to speak, are selected. Instead, the selections are a result of other factors such as managerial policies, governmental laws and regulations, the state of the market, traditional attitudes toward labor in the community, community prejudices, and local social movements. This is what I mean by saying that in-

dustrialization provides a neutral framework but that other factors provide the filling.

Conditions of Life outside of Working Establishments. If we consider, next, the life of industrial workers outside of working establishments we find the same picture of the neutrality of industrialization. In the interest of conserving space, let me take a single but highly important line of illustration—the crowding of new industrial workers into cities. While industrialization may lead to the assembling of workers in cities it does not account for their living conditions. It is not responsible for the congestion, the inadequate housing, the poor sanitation, the faulty school and social service facilities, or the social disorganization which frequently attend such urban residence. Instead, such conditions are due to non-industrial factors such as the presence of physically deteriorated dwellings, the unavailability of land, the high cost of building materials, deficient means of transportation, high rentals, deficient municipal revenue, and archaic municipal policies with regard to the provision of facilities. Industrialization is neutral to the presence and to the play of such factors.

Definitions Used to Interpret Experience. The neutrality of industrialization is to be noted, also, in the interpretations which workers make of their experiences. The role of interpretation, of course, is crucial, for it represents how people judge their situations and organize themselves for action. As implied in my earlier remarks, workers under early industrialization may differ greatly in the schemes which they use to evaluate their work experiences. They may view their work situation as novel and exciting, as providing a source of much needed money, as offering possibilities for personal and family advancement, as being onerous but to be endured for other purposes, or as being exploitative, as being marked by unfair discrimination, and as denying opportunities for improving one's lot. Such schemes do not come from the "objective" nature of the work situation; anyone with wide familiarity with working situations under early industrialization must be acutely aware of the fact that the same kind of objective work condition may lead to discontent for one set of workers but may not do so for other sets of workers. The schemes of evaluation come from other sources such as traditional ideas that antedate industrial employment, a comparison with previous work experiences, a com-

parison with the lot of other types of workers, ideas from the outside world, and particularly agitation on behalf of local social movements. Industrialization is not responsible for the divergent schemes used by workers to judge their experience.

To sum up, we need to note that early industrialization is neutral with regard to each of the four basic conditions which set the character of the classes of early industrial workers. Industrialization does not account for the differences in the composition of these classes, it does not account for the differences in the industrial milieu, it does not account for the differences in outside conditions of life, and it does not account for the definitions used to interpret experience and to organize action. We have to look elsewhere for explanations of the make-up, the experiences, and the conduct of the working classes that come into existence. In my judgment students—theorists and research workers alike—who seek to use early industrialization to account for the character of the new working class are operating with a false scheme.

I have one final observation to make. One may grant the thesis that industrialization is a neutral process, as I hold to be true, yet ask why there is such a high frequency of labor discontent and protest under early industrialization. The answer, I believe firmly, is that early industrialization coincides frequently with situations of intense social change in which strong disruptive forces may be thrown into play. Let me mention a few of such forces: rapid urbanization, setting grievous problems of community and family living, and bringing together a host of unemployed and underemployed people; modernization, introducing new ideas of how to live and new conceptions of rights and privileges which challenge traditional codes and views; the play of interest groups, both vested and new, which seek to exploit the new social setting to their advantage; unenlightened policies and acts by existing governments which are frequently held in distrust because of administrative corruption; and, of particular importance today, vigorous radical and nationalistic movements. Such forces are potent in engendering restlessness and discontent and in promoting protest among both industrially employed and nonindustrially employed people.

It is a grave error in analysis to regard industrialization as responsible for such forces. Early industrialization can take place

and does take place without them. In turn, they can take place and do take place without industrialization. It is questionable scholarship to take their coincidence—when they coincide—as grounds for saying or implying that early industrialization causes labor discontent and protest. Sociologists and other students will do well to re-examine their naive assumption that the industrializing process has definite social results.

University of California, Berkeley

The Changing Imagery of American City and Suburb*

ANSELM STRAUSS

THE IMAGES of city and suburb were once polar images, but as both are merged in a sprawling urban agglomeration they lose their distinctive character. Difficulties of ecological, political and economic integration have afflicted our major cities with the disease of "sub-urbanitis" and now the rise of "exurbia" (the unorganized fringe area beyond the suburbs) produces a new set of questions and problems.—EDITOR

AS THE United States progressed from an agricultural nation to markedly urbanized status, largely during the last half of the nineteenth century, each step of the way was paralleled by Americans' attempts to make sense of what was happening. Making sense of what was happening merged easily with complaints over the way things were going and with predictions and suggestions for the way things ought to go. The United States has had a very rich history of such ideological accompaniments to the objective facts of its urbanization. (Some of these accompaniments were actually quite potent, too, in affecting that urbanization. Almost ninety years ago, for instance, Frederick Olmstead, the urban landscape planner argued that American cities were to outweigh the countryside in the nation's scale, and introduced influential concepts of getting air and light and other rural qualities into the crowded cities by way of planned parks. Olmstead had already built Central Park in New York and was soon to become one of America's most influential city planners.) American urbanization today is still rich

* Paper presented before the section on Town Planning at the 1959 World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Stresa, Italy.

in ideological accompaniments which serve as interpretations and criticisms of the most recent urbanization phenomena and which quite possibly may affect future urbanization in the States.

Today's urban imagery is no longer concerned with the imagined polarity of countryside and city which for so long preoccupied Americans. This polarity was succeeded some decades ago by a presumed polarity of city and suburb—a polarity which followed in the wake of a vastly increased suburbanization of American cities, and the flight of great numbers of city dwellers to the suburbs in search of fresh air, safe and quiet streets, genuine communal life, better standards of domestic living, and—as American sociologists have so often stressed—more prestigious locales in which to live. But the imagined polarity of suburb and city is already breaking down, and new imagery is beginning to take its place. In this paper, I shall briefly consider some of this newer imagery, which imagery should suggest some of the kinds of questions that Americans are raising about the destinies of their metropolitan areas. These are questions which planners are raising too—as well as questions which planners are going to have to take into account.

The first question is: What is going to be the fate of American cities? The broadest range of envisioned alternatives is the continued dominance of cities versus the actual disappearance of cities. The *New York Times*, perhaps only for purposes of provocation, recently raised the alternatives in this way:

One hundred million Americans are now living in metropolitan areas, including their central cities.

Will the new pattern of settlement result in the eventual dwindling of great cities like New York, Chicago and San Francisco? Will they be just islands of national business headquarters, financial clearing houses and other specialized functions within great flat seas in which the other activities of our national life will mingle?

Or will our historic cities sparkle brighter by contrast with the sprawling urbanized regions which they will serve as centers of culture as well as commerce?¹

Far from dominating the American scene today, the big cities are on the defensive, at least in some ways. Our magazines are full

¹ "Expansion of Cities Alters Patterns of Living in U. S.," Jan. 27, 1957.

of stories about cities fighting to make a "comeback," and cities are combating "the threat of strangulation by the suburbs."² One emerging concept of the fate, and function, of the metropolis is that it can serve as the core of the entire metropolitan area. By "the core," urban planners and civic propagandists may mean either business or cultural functions, or both. For instance, the mayor of Detroit like many other civic leaders, advocates strengthening downtown districts so that they can serve as a strong magnet to attract people from distant suburbs, either for daily visits or for permanent residence in a resurrected city. Hence he advocated building expressways to bring suburbanite shoppers into the downtown area: "If we don't make it possible for them to come back, they will build large shopping areas in the outlying communities and we will lose that business." To some other metropolitan champions, "the new metropolis" connotes somewhat less hard-headed emphasis upon business and more upon the cultural and political leadership of cities.³

New concepts are also emerging of who shall—or should—live in the central city. Here, for instance, is the view of William Zeckendorf, probably the most influential of American urban re-developers:

There is a swing back to the cities of the highest-grade type of tenant. He is generally aged 45 and upward. He has raised his children; he has reached the peak of his earning power; his house is now superfluous in size; he is tired of commuting.

That man, if you provide him with appropriate living conditions in the central areas of the cities, can be reattracted on a scale never dreamed of before to a way of life that is impossible to obtain in the suburbs.

He adds, and here we may see what a new concept is involved, that "For each 10 people that the city loses to the suburbs, it can get 10 times their collective buying power in people who return."⁴ In the hands of people like Zeckendorf, the concept of "redevelop-

² "How One Big City is Fighting for a Comeback," *U. S. News and World Report*, July 19, 1957, pp. 86-90; "The New America: Our Changing Cities," *Newsweek*, Sept. 2, 1958, p. 61.

³ Cf. H. Blumenthal, "On the Growth

of Metropolitan Areas," in P. Hatt and A. Reise, *Reader in Urban Sociology* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), p. 660.

⁴ "Can the Big Cities Come Back?" *U. S. News and World Report*, July 19, 1957, p. 73.

ment" has now come to mean a combination of things: partly the replacement of slums with upper-income housing; partly the renovation of "downtown U.S.A." But other planners and influential citizens urge—on moral as well as on economic grounds—that the city ought not to be given over only to the wealthier residents; and in fact, others meanwhile keep pointing to the steady abandonment of the large cities to Negroes, who are thus effectively segregated within the greater urban area.⁵

While cities are "fighting back" against suburbia, the transformation of suburban areas is accompanied by a reinterpretation of life as it is lived there. In place of a relatively undifferentiated "suburb"—a symbolic area contrasting with an equally symbolic city—a differentiated set of popular concepts is appearing. As those suburbs located near the city's actual boundaries become increasingly crowded, becoming virtually part of the city, the "better class" of residents who live further out refer disdainfully to those older suburbs. They make subtle distinctions about the relative qualities of various communities—knowledge essential when unwanted ethnic groups or Negroes may tomorrow set up residence in certain of those locales. Especially with the enormous extension of the suburban rings clear out into the next states, it was inevitable that someone would make a distinction between suburbs and suburbs-beyond-the-suburbs—and Sectorsky's "exurbia" and "suburbia" have met this need for drawing such boundaries.⁶ The sociologists themselves, spurred on by William Whyte's discovery of a certain kind of suburb, chock-full of youthful transients, are beginning to wonder about different kinds of suburban styles.⁷

In past decades, a momentous aspect of the suburban dream was the wish to reinstitute, or establish, the emotionally satisfying bonds of community and neighborhood. For more civic-minded souls, a suburban community also represented a reasonably good way to enter into the political process, something that was much more difficult to effect within the crowded city wards. Both aspirations have attracted a good deal of acid comment in recent decades. The imagery of a truer political democracy has not always been

⁵ Cf. M. Grodzins, "Metropolitan Segregation," *Scientific American*, 197: 33-41 (1957).

⁶ A. C. Sectorsky, *The Exurbanites* (New York and Philadelphia, 1955).

⁷ Cf. David Riesman, "The Suburban Sadness," *Ann. Am. Pol. Assoc.*, 1958.

easy to put into practice, especially as the suburbs have grown larger, or have become the locus of clashes between uncompromising social classes. As for the bonds of community and neighborhood, two kinds of criticism have been directed against these. One kind is uttered by suburbanites who have expected the friendliness and democracy of an ideal small town only to be bitterly disappointed by the realities of suburban living. They accuse the suburb of false friendliness, of mock neighborliness; it has not a democratic atmosphere at all; it is ridden with caste and snobbery. Another kind of criticism is leveled, by suburbanites and outsiders alike, against the achievement of too much "community." It is said that there is no real privacy in most suburbs; and that so deadening is the round of sociability that little time can remain for genuine leisure. While most critics are willing to admit that friendship and communal ties are to be valued, they deride the standardization of suburban communities and their all too visible styles of life (the barbecue suppers, the PTA's, the suburban clothing, the commuting). Since World War II, criticism has continued to mount about suburbia as a way of life. The new kinds of suburbs are so homogenous in population, so child-dominated, so domestic-oriented, so little concerned with intellectual or cultural pursuits—or thus it would seem to the critics.⁸

When conceived in such terms suburbanization seems to represent to inveterate lovers of the city a genuine threat to urban values—a threat even to the nation. In place of an earlier derision of the suburb as an uncomfortable or inconvenient place to live, and added to the fear of the suburb as a threat to true democracy (because it enhances class distinctions), we have now an increasing concern over the continued exodus to suburbs. If it is true that suburban life is inimical to much that has made the city exciting, freeing, and innovative, then—it is felt—there is cause for alarm. Despite the counterargument that the suburbs now have theaters and concerts, the city as the great central locale for the arts and for civilized institutions generally still remains convincing as an image to many city residents. Even intellectuals living in the sub-

⁸ Cf. Harry Henderson, "The Mass-Produced Suburbs," *Harpers*, 207:25-32, 80-86 (Nov., Dec., 1954); also William

Whyte, *The Organization Man* (New York, 1956), Part VII, "The New Suburbia: Organization Man at Home," pp. 295-434.

urbs betray some uneasiness about their abandonment of former habitats and pursuits; and a growing literature of the suburban novel portrays the city as a creative foil to the dull, if necessary, domesticity of suburbia.

The intellectuals are not the only city people disposed to bemoan the strength of the suburban movement; they are joined by urban politicians and by urban businessmen. "Satellite towns, which are the product of decentralization, are parasites"—I quote Zeckendorf again—"jeopardizing the entire fiscal and political future of our great municipalities."⁹ He, like others, argues how detrimental it is to the whole metropolitan community, and thus ultimately to the nation, that suburban cities should refuse to be incorporated into the near-by dominant metropolis.

Such incorporation, or annexation, is one of the burning metropolitan issues of the day. "Does Your Community Suffer From Suburbanitis?" queries *Collier's Magazine*, as it publishes the comments of two noted therapists who analyze this civic disease.¹⁰ They argue that cities have always gained needed breathing space by annexation of outlying areas, but that since 1900 the suburbs have successfully prevented annexation because of fears that they would have to pay higher taxes, would be affected by corrupt municipal governments, would be lost in the huge cities. Yet—as these pleaders for annexation say—these arguments are losing force, for annexation although hard fought by many towns appears to be a growing movement.

Thus a new imagery about the city and its suburbs is appearing. The city as an invading malignant force which threatens the beauty of the suburban village has been a fearful imagery of suburbanites for many years—an imagery which has aroused antagonism against new kinds of neighbors, in complaints about loss of rural atmosphere, and in the continual flight further outward. But a reverse aspect of the city is supplementing the other imagery—namely, that the former idyllic suburban landscape is, or is becoming, a thing of the past. The services which the central city can offer the near-by communities are inestimable, or at least better than can be locally supplied, for the suburbs are no longer

⁹ "Cities versus Suburbs," *Atlantic*, 190:24 (July, 1952).

¹⁰ T. H. Reed and D. D. Reed. See vol. 130, p. 18.

relatively isolated, autonomous, proud towns. They have been swamped with populations, if old; and if new, erected too quickly and without adequate services or without an eye to future growth of population.

Although most suburbanites still undoubtedly imagine the central city to be different from the suburbs, already some prophets are beginning to visualize very little true difference between the two locales. They take delight in pointing out, if they are themselves city dwellers, that the suburbs are fully as noisy as the city; that traffic is getting to be as onerous in the towns as it is downtown; that city people are wearing the same kinds of informal attire. The suburbanite is beginning to notice these things himself.

The flattening out of differences between suburb and city—by the increasing suburban densities and the possibility of planning cities for good living—seems destined to bring about further changes in the imagery of Americans. Very recently several new images have appeared. Thus one sociologist, Nathan Glazer, who loves cosmopolitan city life and who is afraid that it cannot flourish in suburbia, has argued that suburbia itself is in danger of invading, in its turn, the big city.¹¹ This is a new twist, is it not? Glazer's argument is that because redevelopers have combined certain features of the garden city (superblocks, curving paths) and Corbusier's skyscraper in the park, they have in a large measure destroyed "the Central values of the city—as meeting place, as mixing place, as creator and consumer of culture at all levels." If poorer classes are better off now than they were in our older great cities, the rich and the middle class are worse off, while artists, poets, intellectuals, and professors have less propitious circumstances in which to flourish. The city core itself,

the part that people visit, that eager migrants want to live in, that produces what is unique, both good and bad, in the city, as against the town and the suburb. What has happened to that? Strangely enough, it loses the vitality that gave it its attraction.

Glazer asserts that the very density of nineteenth-century cities forced city planners to build towns at the rim of existing cities rather than to plan for better cities. We have now, he argues, to

¹¹ Nathan Glazer, "The Great City and the City Planners" (unpublished paper).

plan for the metropolis without losing that essential cosmopolitanism which makes it great. A rich and varied urban texture must be created, "and this . . . cannot be accomplished by reducing density." Whatever it is that has gone wrong with our cities, he concludes, "one thing is sure: nothing will be cured by bringing the suburb, even in its best forms, into the city."¹² This is a radically different kind of argument—and imagery—from that of the city boy who merely refuses to take up residence in the suburb because he believes life there is intellectually stultifying.

In either case, though, the critic of suburbia takes the city as his measuring rod: he assumes the city as the locus for a frame of mind, a style of life. The proponent of suburbia reverses the procedure and measures the city against a healthier, saner, more sociable, or some other reputed suburban counterpart. There is, of course another, and transcending, position whereby one may avoid taking sides, saying that both city and suburb have their respective advantages—and people who own homes in both locales doubtless subscribe to that particular imagery.

Yet another transcending imagery is possible:

We are going to have to learn a wholly new concept of a city—a great sprawling community covering hundreds of square miles, in which farms and pastures mingle with intense residential developments, factories and shopping centers, with the entire area run purposefully for the common good. . . . These wonderful new cities [the writers promise], aren't as far in the future as they may sound.¹³

Notice their wording. We have to learn a "wholly new concept of a city" and "these wonderful new cities" that are just around the corner. What these terms signify is that the dichotomy of city *versus* suburb is no longer defensible in the eyes of some Americans. In its turn, this dichotomy is in some danger of dissolution like its predecessor, the country-city polarity. When Americans can maintain no longer that the two locales differ then we can expect new imageries to arise—interpretations of the latest phases of urbanization.

¹² A very similar argument is used against contemporary planning of downtown areas by Jane Jacobs in "Downtown Is For People," *Fortune Magazine*, 57:133 (April, 1958). Rhetorically, she

opposes the visual liveliness inherent in the city street to the dull—if grassy—superblock of the planner.

¹³ T. H. Reed and D. D. Reed, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

One can almost see them being born. Not many months ago, *Fortune Magazine* published a series of articles on the "exploding metropolis," closing with William H. Whyte's "Urban Sprawl."¹⁴ Whyte begins his report on the state of American metropolitan areas by warning that their fate will be settled during the next three or four years. "Already huge patches of once green countryside have been turned into vast, smog-filled deserts that are neither city, suburb, nor country." Note that last phrase: it forebodes the invention in the near future of a less neutral, more descriptive, term than the sociologists' colorless "metropolitan area." Whyte himself coins no new term, but his attitude toward the region eaten into by urban sprawl reflects something new. He reports a conference of planners, architects, and other experts that was convened by *Fortune Magazine* and by *Architectural Forum* to tackle the problem of remedying the worst features of urban sprawl. This group made recommendations, based upon the assumption that large amounts of suburban land need to be rescued before they get completely built upon in distressingly unplanned ways. As Whyte says, "it is not too late to reserve open space while there is still some left—land for parks, for landscaped industrial districts, and for just plain scenery and breathing space."¹⁵ The language—and the outlines of these recommendations—are consciously very like that of earlier generations of city planners who were concerned with the problems of urban density; although the current situations, as everyone recognizes, involve a more complex interlocking of city, suburb, county, and state.

Americans are now being told in their mass media that soon they will "be living in fifteen great, sprawling, nameless communities—which are rapidly changing the human geography of the entire country."¹⁶ They are beginning to have spread before them maps of these vast urban conglomerations which are not cities but are nevertheless thoroughly urban: "super-cities" and "strip cities." They are being warned that America's urban regions are already entering upon a new stage of development, "even before most people are aware that urban regions exist at all." And already before

¹⁴ 57:103 (Jan., 1956).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹⁶ C. Tunnard, "America's Super-cities," *Harpers*, 217:59-65 (Aug., 1958).

Tunnard is a city planner. See also by a sociologist, P. Hauser, "A Billion People in the U.S.?" *U.S. News and World Report*, Nov. 28, 1958, esp. pp. 82, 84.

the recently coined concept of "exurbia" is more than a few years old they are being confronted with "interurbia," which is simply all the land not actually within the denser urban strips of land but which lies within the urban regions; an area within which few people live on farms but where almost everybody commutes to work—not necessarily to cities "but to factories and offices located in small towns."¹⁷ As the polar concepts of city and suburb thus dissolve, Americans are being invited to think of urbanization in newer, more up-to-date terms. The new terms, however, technically they may be sometimes used, refer no less than did the older vocabulary, to symbolic locales and associated sentiments.

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¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 61-62.

Autonomic and Decisive Forms of Competition

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A basis is proposed for a theory of competition which will cover all its forms and all areas of social relationship where it occurs. Forms may be classified as either *autonomic*, in which entities are ordered or winners determined by the process itself; or *decisive*, in which results are determined by a decision-maker. The first category includes two subclasses: *crescive*, in which relative rates of growth determine winners, and *Richardson* competition, in which competitors seek to outachieve one another.—EDITOR

ALTHOUGH THE major preoccupation of sociologists in the last decade seems to have been with the nature of organization, the conceptualization and analysis of conflict have also made notable progress, and we are beginning to get new insights into the nature of this important phenomenon in modern societies. As in the case of organization, contributions to the study of conflict have been made across disciplines, and valuable mathematical models suitable to many specific kinds of phenomena have been explored.¹

The same cannot be said of the equally important concept of competition. It has suffered at least partial eclipse so far as sociological thinking is concerned. Despite the fact that scarcely an article appears in the current literature that does not imply an understanding of competitive processes,² the discussion of this topic in

¹ See the UNESCO publication, *The Nature of Conflict: Studies on the Sociological Aspects of International Tensions* (1957). The mathematical models are summarized on pp. 64-73. Kenneth Boulding has in manuscript form a vol-

ume on "The General Theory of Conflict," to be published in the near future. The journal, *Conflict Resolution*, has also been established.

² Achieved status, for example, or social mobility, ecological relationships,

most textbooks is almost cursory; and there has been no major new contribution to this field in at least a decade. Yet competition is no less universal, no less pervasive, and no less fundamental than organization or conflict. Park and Burgess went so far as to say that "competition is the elementary, universal and fundamental" form of interaction.³

The study of competition cuts across many disciplines. Biologists approach it on its most primitive level, that of natural selection or struggle for existence; ecologists even speak of competition among plants. Social psychologists and anthropologists tend to view competition in terms of motivation or in terms of a personality or cultural characteristic, "competitiveness," viewing it from the inside, so to speak. Political scientists analyze competition for office, especially in the form of elections. And economists approach it as a highly rational process for determining the allocation of the factors of production and the distribution of the resulting goods and services. But there has been little over-all theory to encompass the several forms of this competitive process.

It is sometimes said that sociological generalizations, to be valid, must be so broad as to be useless or little better than common-sense aphorisms. Still the more modest middle-range generalization may needlessly reject insights that a more inclusive point of view might offer. The theory of competition discussed here is general; it encompasses any situation in which a winner is selected or chosen regardless of the entities involved. The winning entity might be a species, plant or animal; an idea or an ideology; an artifact; a team, a nation, or a firm; a candidate; a policy; or, in fact, anything at all. The selection or choice may be autonomic or be made by a decision-maker. For the sake of convenience the term selection will be used in the first type of situation and choice in the second. The two characterizing factors which render any situation competitive are

values, preferences, scaled behavior, etc. Also, in the popular press, there is the much bandied about concept "competitive co-existence."

³ *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1921), p. 506. The paradox of viewing competition as a form of interaction did not escape these writers. They explained it by stating that among human beings competition was always complicated by the presence

of conflict, assimilation, and accommodation, that is, by interactional phenomena. Only in the plant community could the process of competition be seen in isolation, uncomplicated by the presence of other social processes (*ibid*). It would probably be preferable to define competition as a process rather than as a form of interaction. See footnote 18 below for a further statement on this point.

scarcity (a zero-sum situation) and individual differences.⁴ It is scarcity which demands that a selection be made; it is individual differences which determine the direction the selective process, or choice, will take.

The discussion of competition by Park and Burgess in their great classic summarized the theory of competition as of the 1920's.⁵ The materials were presented under three headings: (1) the struggle for existence, (2) competition and segregation, and (3) economic competition. The first leaned heavily on Darwin's *Origin of Species*; the second on the succession of plants and populations in a given area; and the third on market forms of competition.⁶ The Park-Burgess approach made its major impact in the researches of the human ecologists in the 1920's and 1930's.

In the 1930's the laboratory social psychologists devoted a good deal of attention to the effects of competition on the performance of individuals, concluding that it had a stimulating effect on quantity if not always on quality.⁷ In 1937 the anthropologists summarized the nature of competition and co-operation among pre-literate peoples.⁸ Competition in the market has, of course, been a long-time focus of interest for economists, and the theories they have elaborated are subtle, elaborate, and complex. The work of Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates, a landmark of the 1940's, pioneered studies on the way voters make up their minds with respect to competing candidates.⁹

In 1949 my own book on *American Community Behavior* made the following points among others: competition may be viewed as a test, although it is not always testing what it is intended to test; as a test, the criterion of validity could be applied to it; it could be judged fair when it was valid in the technical sense; alternatives to competition as a method of selecting winners in allocating scarce goods or services were priority systems, equalization, and chance;

⁴ Jessie Bernard, *American Community Behavior* (New York 1949), p. 84.

⁵ The importance they attached to the process is indicated by the fact that about 7 per cent of the book—70 pages—was devoted to it.

⁶ There was also due consideration of the so-called "inner enemies," namely the defectives, the dependents, and the delinquents, who were conceived of as

incompetent in the sense that they could not successfully compete.

⁷ Many of these studies were summarized in Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb in their *Experimental Social Psychology* (New York, 1937).

⁸ Margaret Mead, editor, *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples* (New York, 1937).

⁹ Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1944).

the rigors of competition could be mollified either by increasing the supply or by reducing the demand, the first being the preferred method in our culture.¹⁰

The present paper is an attempt to make certain distinctions which seem to be basic and to state the theory of competition in such a way as to make possible the application of some of the newer contributions in decision and game theory.

A Theory of Competition

COMPETITION may be viewed as basically a maximizing process.¹¹ But it is by no means always obvious what it is that is being maximized. One of the major functions of a usable theory of competition is to help determine what it is that is being maximized in any specific competitive situation. Witness, for example, the nineteenth century controversy with respect to the meaning of "fittest" in the expression "survival of the fittest." Good theory should guide us in research to find out. What is it that the winner in any competitive situation has to a higher degree than the losers? Good theory would make it possible to render the criteria of success or survival explicit. It should help us face and judge the criteria of success as well as the qualifications of the competitors.¹²

Maximizing implies measurement, at least in the weak form of ordering. It implies ranked differences. The polar opposite to competition is sometimes viewed as co-operation; in economic life it is defined as monopoly. Strictly speaking, the opposite to competition may be a system of priority, one of equalization, or one of chance. A priority system, to be noncompetitive,¹³ must be based on some criterion which cannot be changed, such as age, sex, race, or seniority; otherwise it may become competitive. Equalization may

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, Chapter 5.

¹¹ The concept of maximization, of course, includes minimization also. The Hopi girls who attempt to outdo one another in lack of skill are just as competitive as the Kwakiutl chiefs who attempt to outdo one another in the potlatch. The difference lies in the thing being tested, not in the process itself.

¹² Are these, for example, the criteria we want applied to any competitive

situation? On the practical level, good theory should be a valuable guide in the study of discriminatory practices of all kinds. It would help explain the saying: "History is written not by those who are right but by those who are left."

¹³ The old communist slogan, "From all according to ability, to each according to need" is not a noncompetitive ideology, for there is still some ranking of need, and certain persons must show more need than others.

be achieved in several ways. Priorities may be assigned which give an advantage to inferior competitors at the expense of superior ones; or all competitors may be treated alike, as though they were identical, differences being ignored; they "share and share alike." Chance, like equalization, ignores differences and is hence also a noncompetitive way of selecting or choosing a winner.

Disregarding these noncompetitive methods of ordering entities, we may classify the competitive methods according to whether the ordering is done autonomously or by a decision-maker. The implications of this distinction seem to be of far-reaching sociological significance.

Competition Schema

COMPETITIVE situations may be classified according to any one of several criteria. A common classification is into impersonal and personal competition or rivalry. Economists speak of perfect and imperfect competition. Or we may classify it according to substantive areas, such as economic, political, demographic, status, prestige, etc. Any criterion which is useful is, of course, acceptable.

On the basis of the criterion referred to above, namely the nature of the process which orders the entities or picks the winner, competitive situations may be classified as follows:

1. Autonomic competition, in which entities are ordered or winners determined by the process itself
 - a. Crescive competition, in which relative rates of growth determine winners
 - b. Richardson competition, in which competitors attempt to outachieve one another
2. Decisive competition, in which entities are ordered or winners determined by a decision-maker

Most discussions of competition to date have referred primarily to autonomic situations. But the burgeoning field of decision theory offers techniques for studying decisive competition in greater depth.

AUTONOMIC COMPETITION

CRESCIVE competition is based on differential rates of growth. The archetypical form is the situation subsumed under the rubric

natural selection.¹⁴ Ecological competition among plants and animals is autonomic in nature. So also is the competition among animal populations, including human ones. It is by a process of autonomic competition that one race or ethnic group succeeds another in a given area. It was this process that Francis Walker warned against in the United States, pointing out that it could lead to race suicide for the native-born in competition with the immigrant; or that Max Weber warned against in his study of East Prussia where Polish peasants were displacing German agricultural workers.¹⁵ The rise of Italian and Polish leaders at the expense of Irish leaders in political and ecclesiastical organizations in the United States in recent years illustrates crescive competition in a somewhat different form. But crescive competition is always based on differential rates of growth in a given area.¹⁶

The *Richardson* competitive situation, named, at the suggestion of Kenneth Boulding, after the English student who first worked out the mathematical model for understanding this process¹⁷—any other suitable term for this set of phenomena would be welcome—is exemplified by races of all kinds, such as arms races, auctions, keeping up with the Joneses, rate-busting, pace-setting, the potlatch, and the like. Each competitor attempts to outdo his opponent. The maximum of one becomes the minimum of the other. The relationship between or among the competitors is not really interaction; it is rather one of stimulation and reaction.¹⁸ Two men

¹⁴ Social selection, in the sense that certain cultures and institutions encourage some entities and discourage others, may also be viewed as "natural," and crescive.

¹⁵ *The National State and Germanic Policy* (1894).

¹⁶ It is because competition, as well as conflict, always implies at least a common locus that it is said community is as much a part of competition and conflict as they are of community.

¹⁷ "Richardson begins with a concept borrowed from Gregory's Bateson's study of the Iatmul tribe in New Guinea, called 'schismogenesis,' which means 'the manner of formation of cleavages.' Schismogenesis may be symmetrical or complementary, according as the behavior developed by the two sides is the same or complementary. An

arms race is a case of symmetrical schismogenesis. Basing his analysis on the defense budgets of leading nations from 1909 to 1914, Richardson evolves a set of equations for the rate of increase in arms expenditures, namely,

$$dx/dt = ky \text{ and } dy/dt = lx''$$

(Jessie Bernard, *The Nature of Conflict*, p. 70). Richardson's work is reported in a paper, "Threats and Security," in *Psychological Factors of Peace and War*, edited by T. H. Pear (Hutchison and Co., 1950), pp. 219-35.

¹⁸ Park and Burgess went so far as to state that competition did not even involve social contact: "It is only when minds meet, only when the meaning that is in one mind is communicated to another mind so that these minds mutually influence one another, that social

are competing for the tennis championship title. There is, to be sure, strategic interaction, but the main emphasis is on playing the best tennis possible. It does not make much difference who the specific opponent is; the main thing is to excel him. If or when it makes a difference who the opponent is, the relationship tends to revert to, or to be transformed into, another kind of process.¹⁹

Whether *crescive* or *Richardson* type in form, the trend in autonomic competition is in the direction of regulation and control, usually in the direction of moderation or fairness.²⁰ Even when there is no attempt to substitute decisive for autonomic competition the goal of control is usually to see to it that the process selects on the basis of a desired criterion or variable.²¹

DECISIVE COMPETITION

WINNERS in autonomic competition, *crescive* or *Richardson* type, in effect select themselves. There is no one at the other end of the competitive situation who is ordering the competitors or deciding who the winner should be.²² Decisive competition, on the other hand, does involve a decision-maker; it falls within the province of decision-making theory.

Any ranking of entities according to some order of preference, as contrasted with an order based on chance or arbitrary principle,

contact, properly speaking, may be said to exist" (*op. cit.*, p. 506). Recognizing the difficulties in their statement of the problem, they enlarged their definition of social contact to include common reaction to social stimuli.

¹⁹ Park and Burgess quote Francis Walker as follows: "Competition is opposed to sentiment. Whenever any economic agent does or forbears anything under the influence of any sentiment other than the desire of giving the least and gaining the most he can in exchange, be that sentiment patriotism, or gratitude, or charity, or vanity, leading him to do otherwise than as self interest would prompt, in that case also, the rule of competition is departed from. Another rule is for the time substituted" (*op. cit.*, p. 507). The quotation is from Walker's *Political Economy* (1887), p. 92. More commonly, perhaps, the sentiment that transforms a

competitive situation into some other type is hostility or hatred.

²⁰ The concept of fairness in competition is discussed in *Americian Community Behavior*, Chapter 5. Since competition is viewed as a test, it is judged to be fair when it is a valid test. Difficulty arises, of course, because we do not always know what the variable is that is being tested.

²¹ Businessmen sometimes prefer competition to be on the basis of service, store appointments, etc. rather than on the basis of price. Many consumers would prefer competition to be on the basis of price.

²² There may be decisive competition present even in such situations. The captain of a team may, for example, have to choose one strategy from among several strategies, or one player from among several competing players to play, etc.

is a decisive competitive process. The consumer ranks the competing demands made upon his dollar; the busy executive ranks the competing demands made upon his time; the committee ranks the competing candidates for a job; the woman ranks the competing claims of job and family.

Autonomic competition is seen from the point of view only of the competing entities. To be sure, in the nineteenth-century Nature or God or an Unseen Hand was sometimes viewed as the decision-maker, and natural or divine values were deduced from the qualities of the winning competitors. Thus, for example, Nature preferred the strong (Nietsche's deduction) or God preferred the economically successful (the deduction of the Protestant ethic). But for the most part, emphasis, especially in Richardson-type competition, is on the competitors.

Decisive competition, however, may be viewed from the point of view of both (1) the competing entities and (2) the decision-maker. That is, it may be viewed from the standpoint of the judges in the contest as well as from that of the contestants themselves; of the board choosing the successor to the manager as well as from that of the men being considered for the post; of the executive deciding upon his assistant as well as of the candidates from among whom he is choosing. The decisive competitive situation may be reciprocal, decision being involved among competitors as well as among those who do the choosing, as in the case of freshmen competing for bids to the high-ranking fraternities or from that of the fraternities competing for the most desirable freshmen; or high-school seniors competing for admission to certain colleges and colleges competing for the outstanding seniors, or of scholars competing for a call from the best universities and from the universities competing for personnel, etc.

The decision-makers may be numerous and the competitors few in number; or there may be numerous competitors and few decision-makers. Illustrations of the first are such situations as these: the USSR and the United States competing for prestige in underdeveloped areas of the world; General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler competing for the numerous buyers of automobiles; Republican and Democratic candidates competing for millions of voters in their district; two or three television programs every night competing for the attention of scores of millions of viewers. The

scarcity element derives from the zero-sum nature of such situations; the choice of one entity involves rejection of another.

The situation may be reversed: thousands of high-school seniors compete for admission to a few colleges; hundreds of writers compete for the prize; etc.

Decisive competition from the point of view of the competitors. If a person is engaged in autonomic competition he does not have to worry about pleasing a judge; if he is good, the competitive process will prove it. The person engaged in decisive competition, on the other hand, has to learn how to win the judge or decision-maker rather than how to win the game. As competition becomes decisive, a change comes over the process. The variable that is being maximized tends to become ability to please the decision-maker. The students study how to please the teacher to get grades rather than how to master the material. The research designer works on how to please the granter of funds rather than on how to do the most important research. The worker studies how to please his boss rather than how to produce better. The sycophant studies how to please his Fuehrer rather than how to perform his role. The phenomena referred to as "apple-polishing" or "browning" or fawning are well documented in literature.

Decisive competition from the point of view of the decision-maker. From the point of view of the decision-maker there must always be some criterion according to which an order can be established among the competitors. (There may even be decisive competition among the criteria themselves. What should be maximized, fun or prestige, technical skill or public relations?) If the variable being maximized is measurable, decisive competition may be reduced to autonomic competition. The judge has only to measure the competitors with respect to the criterion; he does not decide who the winner should be; he merely announces who the winner is. Judgment is minimized. The contestant with most coups or points, highest grades, best record, or whatever, wins.

The reduction of decisive competition to autonomic competition is a desideratum often allegedly sought for. An objective test measures all the competitors with respect to the agreed-upon criterion and the highest scorers automatically become the winners. This is the theory behind the so-called merit system for filling civil service positions in government. It is the theory behind the college en-

trance examination system. It seems to preclude favoritism, nepotism, or other forms of discrimination. It seems impersonal, substituting objective rules for subjective human fallibility. It is almost mechanical.

It is not, however, always possible to reduce all competition to the autonomic form. The variable being used as the criterion is not always measurable. It may be multidimensional and complex. It may even happen, as indicated above, that there are several criteria that may be applied and they are themselves competitive. The college wants bright students, but it also wants students with a certain cultural background. The employer wants a competent worker, but he also wants him to be white. The fraternity wants good athletes, but it also wants congenial boys. The young woman wants a husband who is a good provider, but she also wants someone who is fun to be with.

Sometimes the criteria change at some point in the competitive process. Up to a certain level in the bureaucratic structure promotion is based on technical competence; but beyond that level a new criterion is introduced. For the top positions the "generalist" is preferred over the "specialist." The worker with the best technical record is not necessarily the best man for a supervisory job; the best scientist is not necessarily the best laboratory administrator; etc.

Decisive competition is inextricably bound up with values. The problems for the decision-maker choosing among competing entities are these: What is really wanted? What should be maximized? How can this be measured or tested? Which of the competing entities will maximize it? The observer or researcher can determine the values of a decision-maker by the way he makes his choices. This is, in fact, the principle a fair-employment-practices commission usually uses. It studies the employment record of the firm under consideration. If it finds that, let us say, Negroes are actually being employed in a reasonable proportion, then this is taken as evidence that race is not the criterion used in choosing among competing job aspirants. If it is found that a college has admitted, let us say, Jews, Italians, or members of other minority groups in a reasonable proportion, this is taken as evidence that ethnicity is not the criterion used in choosing among competing candidates for admission.

As culture moves a society farther and farther away from brute nature, interposing more and more protection against catastrophe, competition may tend to move in the direction of decisive rather than autonomic forms. In a crisis, however, the tendency is back toward autonomic competition. It is said that it takes about a year after the beginning of a war to locate the most competent generals and to get rid of those whose position resulted from decisive rather than autonomic competition. The original chiefs and vassals of a feudal kingdom win their positions in autonomic competition; later on, promotion tends to become the result of decisive competition. The men who found competitive organizations are at the top as a result of autonomic competition; but their lieutenants and second men and even, often, their successors may get their positions as a result of decisive competition. The variable being maximized, as well as the function being served, is different in the two kinds of situations. It may be ruthless efficiency in one case; it may be congeniality, compatibility, personal trust, in the other. It might even be ability to dish out flattery.

The function of competition, then, is to maximize something or other, to locate a winner and/or arrange all competitors in some rank order. The schema here suggested is based on the process by which this function is performed. Autonomic competition is a self-evaluating test; the "best man wins." He does not win because he is the best man; he is, by definition, the best man because he wins. No judge is demanded, although a referee may be called for to interpret the rules. Decisive competition, however, involves a decision-maker who must choose from among two or more mutually exclusive entities. The values held by a decision-maker reveal themselves by the choices he makes.

*Appendix*DECISION-GAME THEORY APPLIED TO
DECISIVE COMPETITION

WHEN the decision-maker is choosing among competing alternatives, whatever they may be, under conditions of certainty, the measurement problem is relatively, if not absolutely, simple. Whatever he chooses he is sure of getting. Thus only a rank order of preference is required. The question of probability may be ignored. But if he must choose under conditions of uncertainty, so that the value of his choice depends on circumstances over which he has no control, the problem becomes more complex. The game-theory matrix is one way in which to conceptualize and deal with decisive competition under conditions of uncertainty.

One contribution of this conceptualization is that it modifies the older view of competition. It used to be stated that whereas conflict was amenable to accommodation, competition demanded adaptation. It is true that the formulation of alternatives in a game matrix must make them mutually exclusive and in this sense the older point of view is correct. But the concept of a mixed strategy shows that although compromise in the sense of mixing strategies

or conceding points is not possible, compromise in the sense of maximizing choice of several alternatives—that is, a so-called mixed strategy—is possible.

Game theory has been thought of as dealing primarily with conflict situations, although increasingly with non-zero-sum and cooperative ones; but it is a model for decisive competitive situations also. The competitors are not the players but the alternatives from among which the players must choose a course of action.

As an example of decisive competition under conditions of uncertainty we might set up a situation in which a man must be chosen for a top job in a large corporation. There are several candidates from among whom the choice may be made. If the qualifications desired could be objectively measured, the competition would be autonomic; the man with the highest number of points would get the job. But all the qualifications cannot be objectively measured; judgment is required. Not only that, but in the situation we are positing, let us assume that the qualifications necessary for the job differ according

to the future course of events. If there is to be war in the next few years, Candidate A would be the best man; if there is to be no war, but a depression, Candidate B would be the best choice; if there is to be no war and there is to be prosperity, Candidate C would be the best person. (This type of situation is not far-fetched; it is the basis for the old saying that success often depends on being in the right place at the right time.) In matrix form, the situation might look like what is shown in the accompanying table. The quanti-

tative values assigned to the nine cells in this hypothetical matrix would reflect the relative value of the candidate to the corporation according to the probabilities assigned to the different states of nature.

The problem of the competitors may also be one involving uncertainty. What are going to be the criteria according to which we are to be judged? Or, should I spend my time improving my technical competence, in "politicking," or in buttering up the boss? Incidentally, this formulation of

DECISIVE COMPETITIVE SITUATION

<i>Competing Candidates</i>	<i>States of Nature</i>		
	<i>There will be war</i>	<i>There will be no war; there will be a depression</i>	<i>There will be no war; there will be prosperity</i>
Candidate A	His knowledge of procurement under war conditions will be very useful; his Pentagon contacts excellent	Will not be expert in dealing with contracting markets; too conservative in a gloomy atmosphere	Will tend to be over-expansive; will continue to seek government contracts rather than civilian expansion, etc.
Candidate B	No experience with procurement problems; impatient with government red tape. Would not be successful with Pentagon	Would be at his best coping with problems of holding operation; would show ingenuity in dealing with personnel and with public	Would tend to slide along on present pattern, not challenged to innovate
Candidate C	Would be unhappy having to conform to military procurement rules	Would find contracting market unchallenging; would not be interested	Would find this extremely stimulating; would innovate and expand successfully

competition highlights the fact that the interaction is between the competitors and the decision-maker rather than between or among the competitors themselves.

The uncertainty of such criteria is illustrated in a recent article describing how the judges in a photography contest chose the winners. Speaking of the winners, one of the judges said: "They have one thing in common. They all disregarded . . . instructions. Why, a few years ago, no amateur would have dreamed of wasting a frame by taking a picture in the rain as

the first prize winner did. But nowadays we're all beginning to be fed up with the fact that garish colors can be impressive, and we're realizing that you can't get by any longer with just a perfection of the materials at hand. . . ." ("Why the Winners Won," *Saturday Review*, Jan. 10, 1959, p. 48). He continues by advising that next year contestants should take pictures at sunrise or sundown. But if this year's winners disregarded conventional criteria, what certainty is there that next year's winners will not also be innovators?

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Self-Attitudes by Age, Sex, and Professional Training

MANFORD H. KUHN

EXPLORATION of self-attitudes by the Twenty Statements Test leads to the conclusion that responses can be reduced to five categories: (1) social groups and classifications, (2) ideological beliefs, (3) interests, (4) ambitions, (5) self-evaluations. The frequency and salience of responses in these categories are found to vary according to age and sex of respondents and according to their professional identification.—EDITOR

MOST PERSONALITY tests consist of several subscales which attempt to cover either the range of areas of adjustment or the varieties of mental-emotional disturbance. Thus the California Test of Personality is composed of two major parts—a test of self-adjustment and one of social adjustment. Each of these is composed of six subsections, the former subsuming Self-Reliance, Sense of Personal Worth, Sense of Personal Freedom, Feeling of Belonging, Withdrawing Tendencies, and Nervous Symptoms; the latter subsuming Social Standards, Social Skills, Anti-Social Tendencies, Family Relations, School Relations, and Community Relations. The respondent simply checks a “yes” or “no” to such questions (*i.e.*, items, of which there are fifteen for each subsection) as “Do you usually do something about it if someone steps in front of you in line?” “Do members of the opposite sex seem to like you?” “Are people frequently so unkind or unfair to you that you feel like crying?” “Do you keep from letting people know when they irritate you?” etc.

The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, to take an-

other example, consists of nine clinical scales, a measure of introversion, and four measures of what is called the "test-taking attitude." The 566 items are in the form of statements in the first person. The subject is asked to check "true" or "false" in terms of the application of each item to himself. These characteristics are doubtless familiar to everyone. They are mentioned here in order to highlight the contrasting nature of the Twenty Statements Test of Self-Attitudes.

The TST consists of simply asking the respondent to make twenty different statements in answer to the single question, "Who am I?" addressed to himself. Whatever statements the respondent makes become the items, and whatever scales are possible are those which emerge from a content classification of these items after they have been made.

In responding to this request, respondents tend to give, first, statements which are consensual in nature and which refer to groups and categories with which they feel identified and by which they are identified. Thomas McPartland and I have reported on this characteristic in an earlier article.¹ There we noted the regularity of this—a regularity that is such that it forms a Guttman scale. Furthermore we found that the size of this variable (we called it "locus") is significantly correlated with membership in different kinds of religious groups. It is one of my purposes in this paper to report on the differences in locus scores by age, sex, and professional training.

My major purpose, however, is to report on the range of areas covered by the responses to this test, and of course to make a report on whatever is presently available regarding differences in this range by the three social categories mentioned. In order to provide information of a systematic and inclusive sort, more than two hundred student protocols were content-analyzed by the method of successive combination into more general categories with the following results: five broad categories are sufficient to order *all* the responses made.

These five categories are the following: (1) *social groups and classifications* (such as age, sex, educational level, occupation, marital status, kin relations, socially defined physical characteris-

¹ Manford H. Kuhn and Thomas S. McPartland, "An Empirical Investigation of Self Attitudes," *American Sociological Review*, 19:68-76 (1954).

tics, race, national origin, religious membership, political affiliation, formal and informal group memberships); (2) *ideological beliefs* (including statements of a religious, philosophical, or moral nature); (3) *interests* (including statements relating objects to the self, with either positive or negative affect); (4) *ambitions* (and all anticipated success themata); (5) *self-evaluations* (such as evaluations of mental and physical and other abilities, physique and appearance, relatedness to others, aspirations, persistence, industriousness, emotional balance, material resources, past achievements,

EXHIBIT 1

(Responses of a University Senior)

I am of the female sex	I am in the Waves Officers School
My age is 20	I attend church
I am from [city and state]	I live a normal life
I have two parents	I am interested in sports
My home is happy	I am a [department] major
I am happy	I am attractive
I have been to 4 colleges	I have high moral standards
I will graduate in [month and year]	I am an adjusted person
I have a brother	I am of the middle class
I am a [sorority name]	

EXHIBIT 2

(Responses of a fourth grade girl. Original spelling retained)

I boss to much	I fidde around
I get mad a my sisters	I am careless at times
I am a show off	I forget
I interrupt to much	Sometimes I don't do what mother tells
I talk to much	me to
I wast time	I tattle on my sisters
Sometimes I am a bad sport	Sometimes I am unkind

habits of neatness, orderliness, and the like, and more comprehensive self-typing in clinical or quasi-clinical terms.

Many of the protocols contain items covering most of the five categories of responses. A good example may be found in Exhibit 1. Others contain items from only one or two categories. Exhibits 2 and 3, for example, seem to specialize in self-derogation. Others, like the respondent whose protocol appears as Exhibit 4, give evidence of wishing to "leave the field" (Lewin).

The effects of marginality on self-attitudes seem to be plain in the protocol of a senior high school student which appears as Exhibit 5. Exhibit 6, on the other hand, appears to be from a person

EXHIBIT 3

(Responses of a high-school senior boy)

I am a human being	sands of other people
I am a person on this earth	I am just a small thing on earth
I am a nobody to thousands of people	I am a student
I am very small proportion to the thou-	I am a boy

EXHIBIT 4

I am a girl	I am going to take finals soon
I am [name]	I am disgusted with some people
I am an American	I am disgusted with [city]
I am Caucasoid	I am disgusted with the University
I am a student	I am a [department] major
I am going to graduate	I am aware of subtle pressure about me
I am going to work	I am tired of being tied to mother's apron strings
I am getting married	I am anxious to get married
I am under pressure	I am anxious to move far from here
I am anxious to get away from [state]	
I am of average intelligence	

who is well anchored socially. Such status identities as Exhibit 6 represents stand in sharp contrast to the personality traits and interests which predominate in the protocol of a male graduate student reproduced in Exhibit 7. Concern with personality traits is even more evident in the protocol of a school teacher given here in Exhibit 8. The respondent whose protocol is given as Exhibit 9 appears to be trying to define himself as he thinks a clinician would define him.

The research reported here was carried out on twenty-five 100 per cent groups containing altogether 1185 individuals. Table 1

EXHIBIT 5

I am a girl and I wish I were a boy	I am a bitter person at times
I am of an interracial marriage	I am someone trying to find a place in the world
I am a senior in high school about to enter college	I am a person fighting uniformity and dependence
I am a member of a very independent group of brothers and sisters	I am an admirer of beauty in all forms
I am living in a world of wonder and danger	I am not understood by myself
I am a person trying to find truth	I am a person who hates fundamentalism
I am a person finding truth	I am self-centered—I can tell by reaction to situations I face
I am a person finding truth not so delightful	I am trying to understand myself and spend too much time at it
I am a person who is selfish	I am self-conscious, wondering what you'll make of my case when you read this
I am a person who wants to "do" instead of "be" in this world	
I am a solemn person I've been told	

EXHIBIT 6

I am a nursing student	A farmer's daughter
I am a [university] student	A resident of [dormitory]
I am a graduate of [name] high school	Member of [church choir]
Daughter of—	Former president of [church fellowship]
Sister of—	Former judiciary chairman for [dormitory]
Valedictorian of my high school class	Former member of [dormitory chorus]
A senior nursing student	Former member of [dormitory] Council]
A senior nursing student in diploma plan	Member of [nurses' professional organization]
U.S. citizen	
Member of Presbyterian Church	
Resident of [county]	
Resident of [township]	

EXHIBIT 7

I am one who does not know if there is a god	I am one who likes human beings
I am one interested in human beings	I am one who is partially a hedonist
I am one who is searching for values	I am one who is fairly intelligent
I am one who is not dominated by parents	I am one who has many friends
	I am one who is fairly loyal to friends
	I am one who enjoys "good" literature

EXHIBIT 8

I am a serious person	I do not approach others with my views in the right manner
I like to work	I accept what others do, not because of who is doing it but because of what is done
I have ingenuity	I like being a woman—there are advantages
But lack tenacity	I am afraid of laziness
I am loyal to those I don't know as well as those I do know	Some people don't understand what I say because I'm too brief—don't explain
I have overcome obstacles	I feel capable of doing many things
I am an independent thinker but	I do not depend on others for decision
Need encouragement from some	I don't like unfairness
I am somewhat bound by group opinions	
I am not able to take criticism	
I am not emotionally stable enough to get respect of others	

EXHIBIT 9

I am a male	When I have to act quickly in case of a crisis I seldom tense and think nothing of it afterwards
I am an extrovert	As far as sex is concerned I think I am normal
I am generally optimistic	I do think I day day dream [sic] a little too much
Right now when pressed for something to write I become warm all over and slightly tense	
When I become nervous I break out in cold sweat	

lists the kinds of groups and the numbers in each case. No pretense is made that the groups involved cover the range of ages in the life trajectory, and only a handful of the professional schools were covered (and only one practicing professional group). The 100

TABLE 1. THE GROUPS INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY

	<i>Number</i>
Second Grade, University School	28
Fourth Grade, University School	29
Fourth Grade, Grant Wood School	90
Sixth Grade, University School	27
Seventh Grade, University School	31
Eighth Grade, University School	27
Eighth Grade, Wilson Junior High	102
Iowa City High School	89
L'Anse Michigan High School	119
Scattergood School (boarding preparatory)	32
First Year Law (University)	66
Second Year Law	50
First Year Social Work	13
Second Year Social Work	13
Sample Undergraduate Men	65
Sample Undergraduate Women	65
Unitarian Ministers	28
Senior Dentists	48
Freshman Nurses	69
Sophomore Nurses	78
Junior Nurses	79
Senior Nurses (Degree)	17
Senior Nurses (Diploma)	20

per cent groups were used, not because they most adequately provided us with data for the problem at hand, but because they met (in the phrase of my former colleague, Professor Fred Waisanen) "the usual criteria of convenience, co-operation and captivity!"

Changes in Self-Attitudes with Age

McPARTLAND found, in earlier research,² a significant association between age and locus scale types for those in a fairly narrow

² Thomas S. McPartland, "The Self and Social Structure: An Empirical Approach," Ph.D. Thesis, University of Iowa Library, 1953. Microfilm. See pp. 96-97.

age range (18-24). The present research, dealing with a considerably greater age range, found that locus scores steadily increase from those of seven-year-olds (the youngest thus far tested) with an average locus score of 5.79 through twenty-four-year-olds with an average locus score of 11.03.

This association is what we would expect from the orientation. As the average individual grows from the age of seven to that of twenty-four, he becomes—or so we would suppose—a member of more groups, and his roles are differentiated on the basis of divergent categories. As a consequence he will internalize as a significant part of his self-definition a larger volume of these identifying statuses. There is indication in recent research, not a part of the present study, that as people retire their locus scores—as we would expect—diminish, and diminish more markedly when they are not members of clubs and similar organizations.

The *salience of sex mention* increases with age from the early grades through high school. Counting no mention as rank number

TABLE 2. AGE REFERENCE BY AGE

<i>Age</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage Who Mention Age</i>	<i>Salience if Mentioned</i>
9	58	27.6	4.75
10	60	35.0	6.75
12	28	46.4	6.85
13	93	74.2	4.93
15-18	179	59.2	4.62
19-22	130	43.1	5.61

21, the mean rank of sex reference was for the seven-to-ten-year-old group 7.66; for the eleven-to-fourteen-year-old group it was 6.67; for the fifteen-to-eighteen-year-old group it was 5.11. The university undergraduate sample referred to sex in statements having the mean rank of 6.00, but this is probably not so much a reversal as a reflection of the differential selection involved in a university population of those holding the attitudes toward sex described by Kinsey as prevalent in the higher educational level.

In Table 2 are shown *changes in age as an aspect of identity with increasing age*. Only slightly more than a fourth of the nine-year-olds identified themselves by age. This fraction who did identify

themselves by age steadily and rapidly increased until nearly three-fourths of the thirteen-year-olds mentioned age in response to the question "Who am I?" Then, reversing direction, the proportion rapidly diminished until, in the sample of university undergraduates, fewer than half identified themselves by age. It would seem that being thirteen is especially significant in our society since one of our major age-grades—the teen age, with its culturally discontinuous role-playing and curiously detached status—begins with this year of age. To enter the teen age therefore is a rite of passage, and it is significant that it is so apparent in the responses to this self-attitudes test.

The mention of age—at any of these ages—appears to be a fairly significant self-reference. Age is mentioned on the average somewhere between the fourth and seventh places in the order of the twenty statements.

Differences in Self-Attitudes by Sex

Probably the most interesting and at the same time the most significant finding of difference in the responses to the Twenty Statements Test by sex is that with respect to the *sex reference* itself. In the grade school years there is no significant difference between the sexes either in the proportion mentioning sex among their self-definitions nor in the salience of sex reference. Beginning with the high school years the proportion of females to males who give sex saliently as one of the twenty statements in answer to the "Who am I?" question increases. Among respondents in the Northern Michigan high school,³ for example, nearly 78 per cent of the females mention sex first as over against only a little over 64 per cent of the males.

In Table 3, it can be seen that in our undergraduate sample, females were more likely to mention it first, or at least in the first three places. They were also likely to mention sex more than once, for in this sample there were 67 mentions of sex by 65 females, while by the same number of males there were only 46 mentions of sex. The mean salient rank of sex mention (if failure to mention is treated as rank number 21) was 4.1 for females and 7.9 for males.

³ From data collected by Fred Waisa-

nen in connection with his Ph.D. dissertation.

TABLE 3. SELF-ATTITUDES BY SEX

Types of Reference	Females		Males		Chi Square	Probability
	Mention	No Mention	Mention	No Mention		
Sex mention by sex (Undergraduate)	57	8	46	19	$\chi^2 = 5.656$	$.02 > p > .01$
Sex mention in first place	31	34	18	47	$\chi^2 = 5.535$	$.02 > p > .01$
Sex mention in one of the first three places	54	11	36	29	$\chi^2 = 11.7$	$p > .001$
Kin reference by sex	49	16	30	35	$\chi^2 = 11.648$	$p > .001$
Racial identification by sex	6	59	15	50	$\chi^2 = 4.60$	$.05 > p > .02$
Age reference by sex	32	33	24	41	$\chi^2 = 2.008$	$.20 > p > .10$

If only those mentioning sex at all are included, then the mean salient rank for females becomes 1.7 and for males 2.5.

Although no rigorous way of verifying this has yet been developed, it is at least a strong impression that those females in this age group who do not give sex as one of their self-definitions (or else give such reference very late, say, somewhere between eighth and twentieth in rank order) give other self-attitudes which indicate that they conceive themselves as either physically unattractive or as having undesirable personality traits. This hypothesis would seem to merit further investigation. It would be useful in exploring the related but possibly more significant hypothesis that the self-definition as sexually unattractive is self-fulfilling in that it results in behavior being organized and directed in a sexually neutral or sexually negative way.

From the finding that sex is a more salient self-attitude for females one may argue to a number of other interesting hypothesis. One such hypothesis is that the salience of defining oneself as a woman is related to the status of women as a minority group (sociologically speaking) in our society.⁴ We had previously discovered that members of minority groups such as Negroes and Jews are very apt to give such membership saliently in their responses to the Twenty Statements Test. It is apparent, however, that this can be only one of the factors involved in the mention of sex, for males—as we have noted—also define themselves saliently by sex—only less so than do females. Another hypothesis is that disproportionately salient mention of sex by females is greatest during the years of dating and courtship, since it is during this period that females are staking their lifetime status chances on their sexual attractiveness. It would follow from this hypothesis that the larger role of sex in self-definitions for females would tend to decline in middle and old age. It is unfortunate that this research was able to cover only the years of childhood and youth and hence we were not able to test this hypothesis.

Females much more frequently than males defined themselves in terms of their kinship to others. This is evident in Table 3. We would expect women to hold kin membership as a more significant

⁴ On women as a minority group, see —*inter alia*—the familiar Appendix 5,

"A Parallel to the Negro Problem," in Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, (New York, 1944), 2:1073-78.

feature of their self-attitudes than do men, both because women are more restricted in their conduct by the rules laid down in the kin and family system and because they are bearers, or at least prospective bearers, of children and are more largely involved in their rearing. Females are more apt to mention kin more than once, for the 65 females in our undergraduate sample mentioned kin relationships 111 times while the same number of males mentioned kin only 62 times. Furthermore, females mentioned kin more saliently. Counting failure to mention as rank number 21, the mean salience of mention⁵ of kin was 10.4 for females and as 15.7 for males; including only those who mention kin, the mean salience was 6.9 for females and 9.6 for males.

In Table 3 it is evident that males define themselves in terms of *race* more frequently than do females. Males also mention *race*, when they do mention it, somewhat more saliently than do the females (7.53 for males as against 8.33 for females). It is unfortunate that we do not have data on the ethnic attitudes of these subjects, for one would certainly hypothesize from the orientation that those who define themselves saliently in terms of *race* would hold the culturally differentiating (and presumably derogating) attitudes toward those of other racial groups.

If this hypothesis should be supported by empirical data from a representative cross-section of the population, then it would follow that females are less inclined in our society to have *race* as a social object. This would mesh with Dollard's hypothesis about sexual factors in the relations between the races, and with Myrdal's report on the strongest attitude component toward the Negro on the part of the white. Unfortunately most studies of ethnic attitudes fail to report sex differentials if any. Persistent trends in findings regarding anti-Semitism indicate females less anti-Semitic than males. Prothro and Jensen in a study of ethnic attitudes among Louisiana college students⁶ found women to have a somewhat more favorable attitude toward the Negro and the Jew than did the men. Lundberg and Dickson,⁷ on the other hand, found that girls in a high-

⁵ The rank of the *first* mention was used if more than one reference to kin was made by a single respondent.

⁶ "Group Differences in Ethnic Attitudes of Louisiana College Students,"

Sociology and Social Research, 34: 252-58 (1950).

⁷ "Selective Association among Ethnic Groups in a High School Population," *American Sociological Review*, 17:23-35 (1952).

school population made sociometric choices restricted more frequently to their own ethnic groups than did boys. In any event the present finding that in a sample of undergraduates at the University of Iowa significantly more men than women defined themselves by race raises interesting questions regarding the relations between such self-definitions and interracial attitudes in various social systems.

In the same sample of university undergraduates, women more frequently than men mentioned their *ages*, but this difference was not at the usually acceptable level of confidence (see Table 3). It was a difference most of us might expect between the sexes at this

TABLE 4. PROFESSIONAL REFERENCE BY YEAR IN PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL

<i>Group</i>	<i>Percentage who mention in first three</i>	<i>Ave. rank of mention (if mentioned)</i>	<i>Percentage who fail to mention</i>
First-year law students	53.1	3.3	23.4
Second-year law students	59.2	2.8	16.3
First-year nurses	33.3	4.6	18.8
Second-year nurses	65.8	3.6	5.3
Third-year nurses	71.7	3.4	7.0
Fourth-year nurses	70.6	3.7	0.0
First-year social workers	46.2	4.7	7.7
Second-year social workers	84.6	2.5	15.4

age level (18-24). It is probable that the cliché about women being unwilling to tell their ages is one which applies only when age is unfavorable (*i.e.*, older); from the standpoint of our cultural values it is obvious that the best years of a woman's life are the late teens and early twenties.

There was only a slightly greater tendency for males than for females to mention being *U. S. citizens* or *Americans*. It is surprising that so few of these males of draft age made any reference either in this or some other way to this role. Of those students in professional schools who had already served in the army almost all defined themselves as veterans. One might hypothesize that the anticipation of serving in the armed forces is not as pleasurable as the status of having already got it over with.

A final difference between the sexes having to do with self-attitudes is in respect to locus scores. In the grades girls have higher locus scores than boys. The two sexes have mean scale types of about the same order in the high school years. In the undergraduate years the locus scores of men are higher than those of women. This sequential pattern of difference parallels other differences between the sexes—in physical size and growth, in language facility, and in sexual maturation. It would be most logical to relate this locus difference to language and accompanying social participation, though in what precise way they are related awaits exploration.

Self-Attitudes by Professional Training

IF WE MAY regard statements on the Twenty Statements Test as evidence of interiorized self-definitions, then one of the most significant findings is that the importance of the professional role increases steadily with each year in professional school (see Table 4). This is true whether we measure by presence or absence of mention of it, by the frequency with which profession is mentioned in the first place, or by the salience of mention (rank) by

TABLE 5. MEAN LOCUS SCALE TYPE BY YEAR IN
COLLEGE OF NURSING

<i>Year</i>	<i>Mean Locus Scale Type</i>
1	9.37
2	9.08
3	10.04
4	11.90

those who mention it. Note, for example, that while only a third of those near the end of their freshman year of nurse's training identify themselves as nurses in one of the first three statements, more than seven in ten do so by the end of their junior year. Whether or not those who define themselves early and saliently in terms of the professional role for which they are training makes a difference in their performance as students is an intriguing question which awaits further research, but already there are some—albeit slender—shreds of evidence which seem to indicate that there is a relationship here.

It was possible to trace changes in the locus score with increasing years of professional training in only one of the several professional school groups studied—that of nursing. The results may be seen in Table 5, where it is apparent that locus score increases with time spent in nurse's training. It is quite possible that the volume of social anchorage does not increase with years spent in every professional school. Graduate study in general, for example, is often characterized by a considerable degree of rootlessness and marginality. The exploration of this problem must await future research.

The results of content analysis of responses to the TST into the five inclusive categories mentioned early in this paper for students in four professional schools and for members of one adult professional group are given in Table 6. Identities in terms of member-

TABLE 6. INCLUSIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF TST PROTOCOLS FROM RESPONDENTS IN FOUR PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS AND ONE PROFESSIONAL GROUP
(in percentage of total number of responses by each group)

Themata	Unitarian Ministers	Senior Dentists	Second Year Law Students	Soc. Wk. Students	Nursing Students	
					2nd Yr.	4th Yr.
1. Social groups and categories	33	35	39	41	66	73
2. Ideological statements	31	5	12	8	4	*
3. Ambition-success themes	4	15	13	10	1	3
4. Interests	17	16	10	10	11	10
5. Self-evaluations	15	29	26	31	18	14
<i>favorable</i>	8	19	16	16	12	9
<i>unfavorable</i>	7	10	10	5	6	5

*Less than 1 per cent

ships in social groups and categories constituted as few as a third of one group's responses (Unitarian ministers) and as many as approximately three-fourths of another group's responses (senior nurses). On the other hand, as we might expect, the Unitarian ministers made the most statements of an ideological nature—

having to do with moral, philosophical, and religious matters, the place of man in the universe, etc. Nearly a third of all their self-statements were of this variety, while senior nurses made almost none. This supports the social interactionist's contention that man is an object to himself—an object whose meaning to himself and others can only be derived from the system of social objects in which he is enmeshed.

Senior dental students made the largest number of statements having to do with ambition and success, while nursing students made the fewest, closely followed by Unitarian ministers. The dental student protocols indicated they were concerned to make money in a competitive profession, while the nursing student protocols gave no evidence of concern with differential rewards or with competition within the profession once training was completed.

Differences among the groups with respect to the volume of statements made referring to interests (activities, hobbies, possessions, etc.) were small, the two groups making the most being the ministers and the senior dental students.

Statements making explicit self-evaluations constituted only 14 per cent of all self-statements made by senior nurses, and only 15 per cent of those made by Unitarian ministers. At the other extreme they constituted nearly a third of all responses made by students in social work. Furthermore a considerably larger fraction (better than 5 to 1) of these self-evaluative statements made by students of social work were favorable.⁸

Discussion

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD suggested that a person's behavior is a function of his conception of his identity, and further, that his

⁸ If this surprises anyone let him consider the fact that training in social work is often focused on the task of getting the student to know, *evaluate* and *accept himself*. This assertion is not based on impression alone but on empirically gathered data. Second year social work students were asked to write a characterization of the role of the social worker by answering the ques-

tion, "What does a social worker do?" Evaluating and accepting oneself were among the major themes of the contents of their replies. On the TST first year students in social work made a larger proportion of negative self-evaluative statements but a smaller over-all volume of self-evaluative statements, which tends to support the validity of these statements of difference.

conception of his identity derives from the positions he occupies in society. A self-attitudes test, then, must be constructed in such a manner that it will elicit the person's own conception of his identity.

Ralph Linton in his *The Cultural Background of Personality* suggested that there are five general kinds of statuses to be found in every society: age and sex, specialized occupation, family groups, association groups, and prestige rankings.⁹ If we could rely on the check-list type of attitude-measuring instrument for the identification and measurement of self-attitudes, we could check its logical validity in terms of the relation of the items to social statuses of the kinds to which Linton pointed. As Newcomb indicates, however, if we present ready-made statements to a respondent we can never know whether he would have ever made such statements about himself without such suggestion; it is a reasonable conjecture on the other hand that if he volunteers statements about himself "with a minimum of stimulation"—that is, *saliently*—then these attitudes may be taken to be significant ones.¹⁰ The TST is so designed to get the respondent to volunteer statements about himself. The results which we have surveyed in this paper support the proposition that the test is a valid one; that is, a large fraction of the responses express identity in terms of the very categories Linton listed—age, sex, occupation, kin membership, and other group membership. Furthermore the responses vary in these respects by groups according to the functional relevance of these statuses to the dominant roles.

It will be noted that Linton indicated that some kind of prestige-ranking is pan-human. This is doubtless true. If this is interpreted strictly in terms of *class* consciousness, however, our data include no evidence to support it, at least in the groups which were here under study. From a total of 1185 individuals having a potential total of 22700 responses, only fourteen responses were made which were of a class-designating sort. This evidence carries the argument made by Neal Gross regarding the nonsalience of class attitudes one step further.¹¹

⁹ See Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality*, (New York, 1945), pp. 61-62.

¹⁰ See Theodore Newcomb, *Social*

Psychology, (New York, 1950), p. 151.

¹¹ Neal Gross, "Social Class Identification in the Urban Community," *American Sociological Review*, 18:398-404 (1953).

Cooley, in a well-known passage, defined the self, additionally, as a kind of *self-feeling*, indicating the ends of a scale of such feelings as may be represented by the words "pride and mortification." Here again the responses to the TST support the contention that it is valid, for from 15 to 30 per cent of the responses are explicitly of a self-evaluational nature. Many of the other responses, explicitly referring to status have an implicit self-evaluational dimension. We are presently exploring a device whereby the respondent is brought to make explicit such implications.

Conclusion

THE RESEARCH on which this paper has been based was designed to carry the logical validation of the Twenty Statements Test of Self-Attitudes further by examining the responses made by members of twenty-five 100-percent-groups to this test in order to discover whether they were logically related to the self as designated by the orientational theory proposed by Cooley, Dewey, Mead and others of the self- and reference-group-theory approach.

(1) It was found that locus increased with age; that within the age bracket represented by our groups, sex references increased with age.

(2) It was found that females more frequently and saliently than males identified themselves by sex and kin and less frequently by race than did males.

(3) Occupational identity increased with years of professional training, and, within one professional school—nursing—locus scores increased with years of training.

(4) Finally, an over-all content analysis of responses from students in four professional schools and from members of one professional group indicated marked differences in social anchorage, reference to ideology, identity in terms of intention or ambition, and the amount and nature of self-evaluations.

In general the responses were in the direction expected if one argues from the role requirements to the relevant categorical identifications.

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The Comparative Study of Intergroup Conflict*

ARNOLD M. ROSE

Forty present or past societies having distinguishable minority groups are analyzed to discover possible relations between their social structure and the form and intensity of intergroup prejudice, discrimination, and conflict. Significant correlations are found in a number of areas.—EDITOR

THE COMPARATIVE study of cultural behaviors has taken two forms: (1) a description of one or a few other societies, implicitly or explicitly contrasted with what is assumed to be our own; (2) a systematic comparison of a limited set of related behaviors in a great range of societies. The present study uses the latter approach. Outstanding previous users of this approach have been those who have worked with the Human Relation Area Files at Yale University.¹ Our study differs methodologically from the Yale studies in that practically all of our data come from literate societies, while practically all of the Yale data come from preliterate societies.² Most of the literate societies known to the author

* Assisting on this project were 240 students who prepared term papers in my course in Intergroup Relations over four years, graduate student assistants Theodor J. Litman and James Greeno who summarized their papers, and the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota which provided funds to make Mr. Greeno's services available. Appreciation is expressed to all of these.

¹ E.g., George P. Murdock, *Social Structure* (New York: Macmillan, 1949).

² The distinction between these two types of societies is not sharp, as the distinction rests on *some part* of the population learning how to write their own language, and some of the contemporary preliterate people have been taught by outsiders. Also, certain other

in which separable and distinctive minorities are or were living in a majority population were included in the analysis.³ Sometimes a society changed so much in historical time that it was analyzed as two separate societies. Data were collected by senior and graduate students at the University of Minnesota as term papers in the course on intergroup relations. Only the more adequate papers were used in the analysis and in a number of cases there was more than one paper on a given society. The minority groups and the societies compared in the analysis are the following:

Moslems in India
 Falashas in Ethiopia
 Negroes in Brazil
 Chinese in Malaya
 Marranos in Spain
 Parsis in India twelfth to sixteenth century, seventeenth century to present
 Doukhobors in Canada
 Negroes in contemporary France, Germany, and England
 Irish in England seventeenth to nineteenth centuries
 Lapps in Sweden
 Mongols in China, thirteenth to sixteenth centuries
 South Tyrolese in Italy since 1918
 Karens in Burma
 Huks in the Philippine Islands
 Protestants in Italy (including Waldensians)
 Swedish-speaking people in Finland
 Eta people in Japan
 Maoris in New Zealand
 Negroes in South Africa
 Old Catholics in Germany
 Hindus in South Africa
 Jews in Russia
 Mennonites in Paraguay
 Negroes in British Africa
 Indians in Middle and South America
 Arabs in France
 Arabs in Israel

cultural traits are correlated with literacy—such as “advanced” technology—which probably have greater import for intergroup relations than literacy but

are not universally found in all the literate societies chosen for analysis.

³ The United States was not included, to reduce the possibility of bias.

Druses in Lebanon and Israel
 Kurds in Turkey
 Jews in Medieval Russia
 Ainu in Japan
 Christians in Ancient Rome
 Albigensians in Medieval France
 Greeks in Ancient Rome
 Moors in Spain
 Catholics in England
 Bantus in Rhodesia

Our study is focused on intergroup conflict, discrimination, and prejudice even though some of our cases were not characterized by a significant amount of these things. Most of the theories offered to explain problem relationships between groups are in terms of a conflict of interests, ideological (including religious) opposition, specific historical traditions such as racism, and individual psychological mechanisms (such as frustration-aggression, or the "authoritarian personality"). Without in the least denying the validity of these theories, we shall attempt in this paper to relate intergroup problems to a purely sociological variable, namely, aspects of the social structure characteristic of the majority and minority group.⁴ The question posed is: Are specific patterns of intergroup conflict, discrimination, and prejudice associated with certain forms of the social structure? Our ability to answer this question is limited by

⁴ The students were asked to report on the following:

The internal social structure of the minority group

1. Dominant occupations, status of these occupations; class differences
2. Behavior and attitudes regarding intermarriage and social relations with the dominant group
3. Family structure; e.g., authoritarian or equalitarian, large family or small family organization
4. Educational level and attitude toward education
5. Religious affiliations, strength of religion
6. Recreational and social interests and organizations
7. Protest activities, if any (including newspapers)

8. Rates of crime, insanity, suicide, alcoholism, family break-up and other indices of social and personal disorganization
9. Typical pattern of child rearing

The internal social structure of the dominant group

1. Degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity relative to ethnic background, religion, class, region, etc.
2. General type of government and economy
3. Dominant values (e.g., toward power, money, love, etc.)
4. Attitude toward law
5. Class, family, educational, and religious structure and attitudes
6. Sexual practices and attitudes
7. Typical patterns of child rearing

(1) inadequacies in the literature, which usually fails to describe objectively many aspects of the social structure; (2) inadequacies in the sample and coverage of material partly due to our own lack of knowledge of intergroup relations and social organization in many parts of the world; (3) inadequacies on the part of the student readers who sometimes could not perceive how the literature answered the questions they were to answer. Because of these inadequacies, the conclusions of this paper should be regarded as tentative. Because of the significance of its subject matter the study is worthy of more systematic replication.

In considering the dependent variable of conflict, discrimination and prejudice, the concept of "severity" or "intensity" will be used to describe the measure or index employed. Examples of forms of discrimination on a scale of decreasing intensity are execution, torture, destruction of property, restriction of activities, segregation without additional restraints, unfavorable attitudes. While correlation tables will be used to indicate an association, no effort will be made to calculate an exact coefficient of correlation. The somewhat arbitrary methods necessary in a study of this sort, used to select cases and to fit only partially complete descriptions of them into categories, render unjustifiable any exact statistical correlation. The tables to be presented make comparisons and suggest patterns of relationship; they do not provide measurable data.

Discriminations, conflicts, and prejudice were classified for the purposes of this study into five categories: economic, political, personal, religious, and social. These rubrics may best be defined in terms of the major types of behavior categorized into each:

Economic discrimination. Destruction or confiscation of property, restrictions on land or property ownership or business practices, discriminatory employment practices.

Political discrimination. Withholding of citizenship, the right to vote, or positions of political authority.

Individual discrimination or persecution. Physical violence, execution, imprisonment, requiring registration or identification, curfews, suppressing press or schools.

Religious discrimination or persecution. Desecration or preventing building of place of worship, forcing disobedience of religious rules, penalizing worship or other religious practices.

Social discrimination. Forbidding social intercourse, segregation, physical isolation, suppressing "culture," relegating to socially inferior positions, restricting public (but nonpolitical) roles, unfavorable attitudes.

The findings of the study are the following.

TABLE 1. FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION REPORTED IN SOCIETIES WITH A FEUDAL ECONOMY
(Number of Societies Reported)

	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Personal</i>	<i>Religious</i>	<i>Social</i>
Extremely harsh	1	1	8	1	1
Relatively harsh	2	...	3	1	1
Moderate	2	1	3	...	7
Little or none

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION REPORTED IN SOCIETIES WITH SLAVE ECONOMIES AND SLAVERY IN RECENT PAST
(Number of Societies Reported)

	<i>Economic</i>		<i>Political</i>		<i>Personal</i>		<i>Religious</i>		<i>Social</i>	
	S	PS*	S	PS	S	PS	S	PS	S	PS
Extremely harsh	1	...	1	...	5	...	1
Relatively harsh	...	4	2	...	1	...	1	...
Moderate	3	3	...	4	1	3	7
Little or none	6	1

*S, Slave Economies; PS, Recent past

Discrimination in feudal economies (Table 1). The literature gives greatest attention to personal discrimination, and in feudal economies most of it tends to be harsh. Economic patterns tend to be fixed, and the consistency modifies some of the harshness of treatment of minority groups. Social segregation exists, but it is not a main source of harshness of treatment of minorities in feudal economies.

Discrimination in slave and former slave economies (Table 2). The pattern described above for feudal economies applies also

TABLE 3. COMPARISONS OF FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION REPORTED IN SOCIETIES
WITH VARYING FORMS OF GOVERNMENT
(Number of societies reported)

	Economic				Political				Personal				Religious				Social			
	AM	T	CM	DA	DL*	AM	T	CM	DA	DL	AM	T	CM	DA	DL	AM	T	CM	DA	DL
Extremely harsh	1	1	10	1	1
Relatively harsh	7	...	2	1	1	3	2	...	1	...	3	1
Moderate	6	2	4	1	2	2	2	3	2	...	6	2	3	2	2	6	1
Little or none	1	...	1	1	1	2

*AM, Autocratic Monarchy; T, Totalitarian; CM, Constitutional Monarchy; DA, Democratic form with authoritarian rule; DL, Democratic form with much individual liberty.

to slave economies. There is a great difference in intergroup relations, however, for societies that have abolished slavery. Harsh personal treatment has been largely abandoned; social and political discriminations are somewhat abated; it is economic discrimination that is most likely to continue. It may be that the proper interpretation of this is that economic exploitation can be maintained even where slavery is abolished and along with it much of the personal mistreatment and other deprivations incidental to slavery. While this might be a cynical Marxist interpretation in one respect, it recognizes the non-Marxist fact that many important group behavior patterns can be changed without changing a basic economic exploitation of minorities.

Discrimination in societies with different forms of government (Table 3). The greatest harshness toward minorities seems to occur in absolute monarchies, especially in regard to personal violence and economic exploitation. There is not much difference in patterns of discrimination between societies with other forms of government, except that religious discrimination seems to be avoided in democratic societies.

Discrimination in societies in which religion is integrated with government (Table 4). In theocracies or in societies in which the

TABLE 4. FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION REPORTED IN
SOCIETIES WHERE RELIGION IS CLOSELY
INTEGRATED WITH GOVERNMENT
(Number of societies reported)

	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Personal</i>	<i>Religious</i>	<i>Social</i>
Extremely harsh	...	6	5	...	1
Relatively harsh	8	...	3	3	3
Moderate	7	3	7	...	12
Little or none	1	...

rulers claim divine sanction, and where the religious and political authorities are combined, there tends to be an emphasis on political discrimination, and to a somewhat lesser extent on religious discrimination, against minorities (which are presumably mainly differentiated on the basis of religion). Personal discrimination (including violence) is extreme in some of these societies, but moderate in others.

Discrimination in societies in which the dominant group is highly nationalistic (Table 5). There seems to be no evidence from the literature that there is harsh discrimination in any respect against minorities in those societies in which the dominant group feels a strong sense of nationalism.

TABLE 5. FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION REPORTED IN SOCIETIES WHERE DOMINANT GROUP FEELS STRONG NATIONALISM
(Number of societies reported)

	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Personal</i>	<i>Religious</i>	<i>Social</i>
Extremely harsh
Relatively harsh	1	...	1
Moderate	2	3	3	...	4
Little or none	1	...

TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION REPORTED IN SOCIETIES WHERE THE DISCRIMINATED GROUP IS PERCEIVED AS AN ECONOMIC THREAT AND AS A POLITICAL THREAT
(Number of societies reported)

	<i>Economic</i>		<i>Political</i>		<i>Personal</i>		<i>Religious</i>		<i>Social</i>	
	E	P*	E	P	E	P	E	P	E	P
Extremely harsh	...	1	...	2	2	7	...	1
Relatively harsh	3	1	1	3	1	2	1	1
Moderate	6	5	1	1	3	3	2	6
Little or none	1	1	...

*E, Economic threat; P, Political threat.

Discrimination in societies in which the minority is perceived as an economic threat or as a political threat (Table 6). There is some slight evidence that political discrimination is greater where the minority is perceived as a political threat, but not that economic discrimination is greater where the minority is perceived as an economic threat. The intensity of personal attacks tends to be greater when the minority is seen as a political threat.

Discrimination in societies where there is strong respect for law and in societies where respect for law is weak (Table 7).

There seems to be a greater likelihood of personal attacks on members of the minority in societies where respect for law is low or casual, as might be expected. But there is no evidence that respect for law is associated with intensity of other forms of discrimination.

TABLE 7. COMPARISON OF FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION REPORTED IN SOCIETIES WITH DEEP OR MODERATE RESPECT FOR LEGAL AUTHORITY AND CASUAL ATTITUDE OR DISRESPECT FOR LEGAL AUTHORITY
(Number of societies reported)

	<i>Economic</i>		<i>Political</i>		<i>Personal</i>		<i>Religious</i>		<i>Social</i>	
	H	L*	H	L	H	L	H	L	H	L
Extremely harsh	1	1	...	6
Relatively harsh	4	3	...	1	2	3	1	1	1	2
Moderate	4	4	3	2	2	3	7	5
Little or none	1	1	...	1	...

*H, Respect for legal authority; L, Casual attitude or disrespect.

TABLE 8. FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION REPORTED IN SOCIETIES WITH WELL-DEFINED CLASS SYSTEMS
(Number of societies reported)

	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Personal</i>	<i>Religious</i>	<i>Social</i>
Extremely harsh	...	3	10	1	2
Relatively harsh	5	...	4	2	2
Moderate	7	2	4	...	10
Little or none

Discrimination in societies with well-defined class systems (Table 8). Personal discrimination seems to be the most frequent form of intergroup antagonism in societies with well-defined class systems. Social discrimination might have been expected to occur frequently in such societies, but such does not seem to be the fact. It may be noted that social discrimination was judged as moderate for most of the societies examined throughout this study. Social discrimination seems to be especially characteristic of societies in which the ideology of racism appears as a dominant cultural trait.

There are not many such societies in existence. Included in our study as racist societies were only South Africa and Germany (the United States was deliberately excluded from the analysis).

University of Minnesota

BOOK REVIEWS

THE FREUDIAN ETHIC. By Richard LaPiere. *New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1959. 299 pp. \$5.00.*

THIS book is of similar genre to several which recently have attempted to tie together social change, national character, and national ethics. LaPiere's effort develops a theory of social change, traces the dynamics of American society back to a distinctive ethic, shows that a new ethic is taking its place, blames Freud and Freudianism for the misshapen social character now being produced, and asks, in effect, for a return to the previous ethic founded on rationalism and individualism.

Examining the work in more detail, we observe first a departure from those theories of social change which emphasize diffusion—invention—discovery as suprahuman processes. Every social change, says LaPiere, has its origin in individual innovation. And every individual, not merely the biologically atypical "great man" and the social deviant, is capable of innovation. In most traditional societies, it is true, the innovator has been the atypical and has been forced to play the deviant's role. However, a dynamic society is possible—one in which the innovator is not treated as a deviant but is encouraged and rewarded for his enterprise and is charged with the responsibility for realizing his

capacities to the fullest. Such a society has been exemplified by America from its Age of Enlightenment to the end of World War I.

Enter now Freud. Immediately jeopardized are the very values, attitudes, and institutions which gave American society its dynamic character. The socialization process has become permeated with Freudianism and its doctrine of social irresponsibility and personal despair. American character and national ethics suffer accordingly.

Freud, says LaPiere, asserted that man by nature is contrasocial. The psychical, i.e., biologically determined, forces of the *Id* are in perpetual conflict with the *Superego* as developed in a context of social relations, particularly with the father and mother, and with the external social environment. The individual is conceived as a virtually helpless pawn of these conflicts. To LaPiere this doctrine is morbid and discouraging. The Freudian Ethic, as developed by neo-Freudians, elaborates Freud's theory into an ethic of social and personal adjustment. As such it is essentially negative, stressing the weakness and irresponsibility in the individual. Yet to avoid harming the psyche, the individual

should not be compelled to submit to social authority nor compelled to accept responsibility for himself or his society.

LaPiere goes on to assess the influence of the Freudian Ethic on specific American institutions: the school, work-situations, agencies of social control, etc. The sociologist, he notes, has conspicuously neglected this job. His own criticisms of these facets of social organization are not unfamiliar: the family is overly permissive and breeds ego-centric, irresponsible adults; so-called progressive education has gotten out of hand; the criminal is coddled rather than punished; and such devices as parole and probation are ineffective.

Followers of Sigmund Freud will undoubtedly have much to say in the defense of the theories of their mentor. It must be said here in brief that Freud objected to tyrannical authority—his works are better received in democracies than in totalitarian and authoritarian countries. And he certainly did not object to the sublimation and displacement of sexual forces

into areas which would be creative and productive. It seems quite a large order to blame Freud and followers over whom he had little control, such as Jung and Adler, for the deficiencies of present day Western society.

The impression this book gives is that the nineteenth century was a sort of Golden Age in American society if not in the history of mankind. In short, we need a return to the Protestant ethic and the sternness of a Puritan society. LaPiere's strictures are unyielding; the moralistic tone is never softened; his reformism is total.

LaPiere writes excellently; his style is smooth, compelling, and caustic. He addresses himself to social problems which are undoubtedly crucial and pressing, and his work deserves a careful reading by all serious students of society. Those who do not will only be furthering the invidious operation of the Freudian Ethic by evading their social responsibility.

MARY SHELDON
University of Missouri

FAMILY AND CLASS DYNAMICS IN MENTAL ILLNESS. By Jerome K. Myers and Bertram H. Roberts. *Philadelphia: John Wiley & Sons, 1959. 295 pp.*

THIS is a report on the second part of a research dealing with the relationship between social class and mental illness in a New England community. The first part of the study is contained in the well-known volume, *Social Class and Mental Illness* by August Hollingshead and Frederick C. Redlich. The first investigation relied primarily

on a macroscopic approach, with mass data, with little attempt to investigate in depth the relation between social stratification and illness. This second study attempts to combine a statistical with a case method of investigation. It concentrates attention on fifty subjects with the use of an elaborate, standard schedule seeking to probe rather

deeply, but through the use of a uniform instrument, the finer nuances of the relation between class and the development of mental disorder. The cases were carefully chosen, one half from Class III on the Hollingshead Scale and one half from Class V. Class III represents a lower middle class stratum of the community while Class V includes persons from an unskilled, low income, and poorly educated group. One half of the patients in each class had been diagnosed as schizophrenics and one half as psychoneurotics.

The investigation is centered on two hypotheses that (1) social and psychodynamic factors in the development of mental illness are correlative to the individual's position in the class structure; and (2) that mobility in the class structure is related to the development of mental illness. The authors make use of the two concepts "press" and "stress." By the former they mean external pressures from the community and by the latter inner tensions built up in response to the former. They feel that the first hypothesis was fully substantiated by the investigation. Significant differences between patients from the two classes were found in the areas of intrafamilial role relationships, sex-role development, external community pressures, attitudes toward illness and toward the therapy process. The second hypothesis, that social mobility is related to illness, was only partially supported by the results since mobility was related to

illness in Class III but not in Class V. The relative absence of mobility strivings in Class V made it difficult to establish the proposition in this group of patients. Both presses and stresses seemed more severe in Class V than in Class III and among schizophrenics than among psychoneurotics. Such differences lead to the inference that there might well be a difference between social classes in the paths to the development of mental illness.

The authors are careful to point out that social class is not the only or even the most important factor in the development of psychiatric illness and that their study has a great number of limitations which must be kept in mind in the interpretation of the results. Emphasis is placed, however, on the generalization that the understanding of mental illness in American society cannot ignore the important role played by social class and mobility in the class structure, and cannot be limited only to the exploration of organic, intrapsychic or interpersonal factors.

This book is a worthy companion volume to the Hollingshead, Redlich, study. By different methods it substantiates the conclusions of the earlier investigators and underscores, again the necessity for a new look, from a sociological viewpoint, at the problem of psychiatric illness in the United States.

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THE FLOW OF INFORMATION. AN EXPERIMENT IN MASS COMMUNICATION. By Melvin L. DeFleur and Otto Larsen. *New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. 283 pp. \$4.50.*

WHATEVER one's opinion of the value, appropriateness, or for that matter, the possibility of "serendipity" we are in general agreement as to what the term refers to. *The Flow of Information* provides us with an example of serendipity or, if you prefer, what serendipity would involve, were such an occurrence possible.

As Lundberg states in the Foreword, it is only recently that large scale studies of symbolic behavior amenable to scientific method have been undertaken. The "large scale study" presented by the authors was an investigation of the effect of leaflet dropping in facilitating widespread and effective communication under conditions of stress and anxiety. This research program spanned three years and covered eight communities. The Air Force sponsored "Project Revere."

The authors present an excellent, if quite general, treatment of the several aspects of communication, referring especially to the primacy of symbolic interaction in social organization. The stated objective of the volume is "*to map the pathways and search for regularities in the process of message diffusion or communication through human social organization.*"

Briefly described, the procedure was as follows: leaflet dropping over a large area followed by interviews of community residents three days after the drop, thus allowing time for adequate diffusion (predetermined in pilot studies). The

methodology and procedures employed were well formulated and controlled. The section on design and techniques is one of the most concise presentations of this kind existent in the literature. An example: the complete co-operation of mass media agencies was insured prior to the leaflet dropping, thus guaranteeing that the diffusion of the information be restricted to the reading and word of mouth transmission of the leaflets' contents.

The data were then processed, cross-checked against census data, applied to a predevised mathematical formula, and statistically tested.

The ultimate findings were somewhat disappointing but not discouraging, either to the investigators or the readers of their report. A thorough analysis is made of the validity and reliability of the research instruments employed, and these findings are a definite contribution to sociological research methods.

The significance of this volume lies in its presentation of the conception and statement of the research problem; a thorough examination and discussion of relevant bodies of theory; a detailed description of procedure; and an objective and relevant analysis of the conclusions. In this accomplishment the authors have demonstrated necessary relationship existing between existent theory and empirical, quantitative investigation, and, what is more significant, have demonstrated how to most effectively utilize this relationship.

The nature of the problem—that of communication diffusion and effect upon social organization—indicated that in attempting to research symbolic interaction processes, typically human behavior involving a uniquely social and abstract set of relations lends itself to empirical investigation and quantitative analysis based on mathematical models.

It is, however, the presence of a complete system of communication theory upon which the problem's conception is based, and application of a mathematical model and quantitative analysis as tools of research rather than a project wherein the

goal seems often to be that of validating statistical rather than sociological hypotheses, which affords the reader his bonus.

And, as a second instance of serendipity, *The Flow of Information* enlarges and enriches the body of communication theory through illustrating that processes of symbolic interaction and regularities in the diffusion of communication can be measured, referred to, and quantified if methodological requisites are strictly adhered to.

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THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION. By Thomas Ford Hoult. *New York: Dryden Press, 1958. 436 pp. \$5.25.*

WITH THE publication of this volume the teachers of undergraduate courses in the sociology of religion have a choice of three competently written textbooks, each in a different style—Nottingham's paper-backed outline, Yinger's combination text and readings, and now Hoult's conventional textbook.

All three books take a functional and comparative approach to the subject. However, Hoult, in keeping with a strictly sociological orientation, limits the scope of his book to religion as a social institution and the interrelations between religion and other institutions. He deliberately excludes the personal functions of religion and its social psychological manifestations. Even his chapter on religious leadership is restricted to the impact of cultural and social determinants on leaders and eschews consideration of religion as a type of collective

solution to chronic problems of personal adjustment.

Hoult brings unity into a very diverse body of material by applying a limited number of explanatory principles. He most frequently interprets historical and ethnographic data in terms of cultural determinism, which he calls "socio-cultural compatibility." He supplements this general factor with other appropriate processes including the struggle for power between groups and strata, institutionalization, differentiation, and cultural conflict. He gives scant attention to the social factors of collective behavior manifested in religious crowds, nativistic cults, and sectarian movements.

Although Hoult often makes penetrating use of these concepts they sometimes seem too abstract to be illuminating. He might have gained a closer correspondence between theory and data by separately inter-

preting different types of religions (based, perhaps, on the sect-church continuum) or of religions in different types of societies (using the folk-urban axis). Middle range theories applicable within types would be more meaningful than generalizations of presumed universal validity. In my judgment the author uses his method most successfully in the chapters on rural-urban differences, and religion and the political order.

In his chapter on stratification the author employs a novel method of first presenting a body of factual data and following it with a section of theoretical analysis. However, he fails to convince the reader that he has presented "the facts" because they are obviously selected to fit the anticipated interpretation. He would have been more convincing if he had presented a report of a real case having an approximation to the concreteness and complexity of actual experience instead of bits of evidence taken from a variety of cultures.

Since Hoult demonstrates familiarity with a vast literature, including anthropological and historical

as well as sociological sources, his few errors can be forgiven. He writes of Sir Ghost as the major God of the Manus (p. 24) and their chief deity (p. 249), but the term actually refers to the ghosts of recently deceased relatives, one of whom resides in each house and serves as a protecting spirit for its inmates. He refers to "Gillin's study of the Amish" (p. 148), which Gillin himself (in *The Ways of Men*, 1948) acknowledges to be based on Walter Kollmorgen's monograph. Since Lundberg, Schrag, and Larsen (*Sociology*, 1954, p. 183) also failed to identify the primary source of the Amish material in Gillin's textbook I am pointing it out here with the expectation that future credit for the Amish data will go to the man who did the field work.

Finally I wish to commend the publisher for the impeccable editorial work and the superior craftsmanship of this and his other books, and hope that Henry Holt will absorb these standards along with the Dryden book list.

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The University of Kansas





BOOKS

SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN AMERICA: Costs and Casualties in an Acquisitive Society

By HARRY C. BREDEMEIER and JACKSON TOBY, both of Rutgers University. Gives the reader an understanding of the genesis of social problems, while providing him with an appreciation of

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By JOHN W. THIBAUT, University of North Carolina, and HAROLD H. KELLEY, University of Minnesota. This book brings order and coherence to present-day research in interpersonal

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By JEROME K. MYERS and the late BERTRAM H. ROBERTS, both of Yale University. An examination of the relationship between social stratification and psychiatric disorders, this book

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